Mercier, Chas.

Human Temperaments: Studies in Character.

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HUMAN TEMPERAMENTS

Studies in Character

BY

CHAS. MERCIER, M.D., F.R.C.P.

THIRD AND ENLARGED EDITION

INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING NEW STUDIES:—

THE EMOTIONAL TEMPERAMENT
THE HISTRIONIC TEMPERAMENT: THE POSEUR
THE SHY PERSON
THE VULGAR PERSON

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CONTENTS.

CHAP.		PAGE.
	PREFACE	7
	TEMPERAMENT—WHAT IS MEANT BY TEMPERAMENT	9
I.	THE ARTISTIC TEMPERAMENT	16
II.	CLEVERNESS AND CAPABILITY	23
III.	THE TEMPERAMENT OF THE ARTIST	29
IV.	THE ENVIOUS TEMPERAMENT	36
V.	THE JEALOUS TEMPERAMENT	42
VI.	THE EMOTIONAL TEMPERAMENT	48
VII.	THE SUSPICIOUS TEMPERAMENT	56
VIII.	THE RELIGIOUS TEMPERAMENT	62
IX.	THE HISTRIONIC TEMPERAMENT: THE POSEUR	69
X.	THE SHY PERSON	77
XI	THE VULGAR PERSON	85
XII.	THE FADDIST	89
XIII.	THE PHILOSOPHER	95
XIV.	THE MAN OF BUSINESS	101
XV.	THE PRACTICAL MAN	107
XVI.	THE MAN OF ACTION	114

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PREFACE.

> Know then thyself, presume not God to scan ;
> The proper study of Mankind is Man.

Especially Woman, as a witty commentator has added. As Pope stole the whole of the shallow philosophy of his most celebrated essay from Bolingbroke, so he stole three-quarters of this, its most often quoted couplet, from others—half his first line from Pythagoras, and all the second from Warburton. From such a pilferer one would not expect much that is original, but the Essay contains one doctrine that is undoubtedly original with Pope, and it is also undoubtedly erroneous: the doctrine, once universally accepted and now almost forgotten, of the ruling passion.

> On diff'rent senses diff'rent passions strike ;
> Hence diff'rent passions more or less inflame,
> As strong or weak, the organs of the frame ;
> And hence one MASTER PASSION in the breast,
> Like Aaron's serpent, swallows up the rest.
> As Man, perhaps, the moment of his breath,
> Receives the lurking principle of death :
>
>
>
> So, cast and mingled with his very frame,
> The Mind's disease, its RULING PASSION came.

It needs very little observation of human nature, very little of that proper study of mankind which the opening lines of the Second Epistle commend to us, to discover how hopelessly erroneous this doctrine is. Pope

derived it, not from the study of mankind which he recommends, but, as the German derived his description of the camel, from his own inner consciousness. No man is dominated, in the way Pope described, by a ruling passion ; but nevertheless different passions, that is to say, different desires, emotions, propensities, capabilities, and so forth, do attain to very different degrees of intensity in different people, and the constitution of what we now call the character, or what our ancestors called the temperament, varies widely, and has been a favourite study ever since the birth of philosophy. The following pages attempt a description of some common types of character, drawn, not from the inner consciousness of the writer, but from study of Man—and Woman.

TEMPERAMENT

WHAT IS MEANT BY TEMPERAMENT.

The word "temperament" was much used by our forefathers, and had for them a definite and important meaning; and the thing it stands for was much considered and studied by them, and formed an important consideration in their practice of medicine. The word is little used nowadays, nor is the thing it stands for much regarded, and we are apt to scoff and sneer at our forefathers for using it at all. A generation ago, unless a thing could be weighed in bulk, seen under the microscope, or identified by chemical reaction, we were inclined to deny its existence. This is perhaps a better attitude than that of general and indiscriminate credulity, but it is apt to result in narrowness of view, and in blindness to important matters that cannot be submitted to physical or chemical tests. That wave has passed on, and we are now in the trough between it and the next. Now we are all devotees of hypnotism, telepathy, psycho-analysis, Christian Science, suggestion, or psycho-therapy in some form or other; and our faith in these things is certainly neither wanting in robustness, nor proportioned to the tenuity of the evidence in their favour. Vain and useless as they are for the most part, and pernicious as they are in large

part, these faiths have at any rate this merit : that they do recognise the importance of things that are not material things. They do recognise the desirability of taking into consideration, in the treatment of disease, the mental constitution as well as the physical constitution of the patient.

The besetting vice of surgery is that it is apt to look upon disease as affecting a single organ, and to assume that if the organ is removed the disease will disappear, and the patient will recover. The disease of the organ is removed with the organ, the wound heals, and the surgeon triumphs and departs ; occasionally the patient dies of the rest of his malady, which was unaffected by the operation. The view taken by the physician is less limited, but it is very apt to be incomplete. He regards the patient as a very complicated mechanism which has fallen out of gear in this respect and in that, and his business is to discover the source of the derangement and to rectify it as far as possible. When the physical apparatus is again in working order he, too, departs, and considers his patient cured. But very often the patient is not then cured. His physical apparatus may be working competently, but yet there is something wrong. He cannot do his work satisfactorily. He is not happy. His relations with his wife and family are not what they ought to be. There is a hitch somewhere : there is some weakness, something awry, something that has not been taken into consideration, because the patient has been looked upon as an aggregate of organs and tissues performing functions, and not as a man, not as a whole, not as an integrated living being, living by virtue of his relations and his intercourse with the world around him. The physician

cannot treat his patient satisfactorily unless he looks upon his patient, not as a complicated bundle of organs, one or more of which is deranged in its function, but as a whole—as a man having relations with the world around him, on which he acts and which reacts on him ; and with respect to these actions and reactions the man is summed up, not in his organs and their functions, but in his mind.

Disease cannot be rightly, comprehensively, or satisfactorily treated unless the treatment is directed, not to the disease, but to the whole man who is suffering from the disease, to the whole man, who may be described as a mind working through and by means of his body. By all means rectify the bodily functions ; but do not think that when you have relieved the patient of his bodily disease you have necessarily cured the patient. This is not done until he is restored to efficiency in dealing with his circumstances, and this is a matter that concerns primarily his mind. Patients used to have faith in the old family doctor because he 'understood their constitutions.' Modern scientific physicians, especially when they are young, are apt to sneer at the phrase, and to consider it an antiquated superstition ; but there was much truth in it. The family doctor, who had brought both the patient and perhaps the patient's future wife into the world ; had attended them in their childish ailments, talked over them with their parents, seen them off to school and welcomed them home again, advised about their occupations, and watched their careers, accumulated a store of knowledge about them that was invaluable when his services were needed. He knew their weak points and their strong points, both bodily and mental. He

knew what they could do, and what they could not. He knew how they were likely to react, not only to drugs, but to prosperity and adversity, to kindness and severity, to worry and anxiety. In short, he knew their physique, and he knew their temperament.

The physique, or, as the mediæval physicians called it, the corporature, is the bodily constitution of the patient, the order of architecture, as it were, to which his body belongs, the way in which he is compounded; and so the temperament is his mental constitution, the order of mental architecture to which his mind conforms, the way in which his mind is put together, the absolute and relative magnitude of its ingredients, and the general composition of its structure. The temperament is the physique or corporature of the mind, and the word as well as the idea comes down to us from a remote past. Ancient and mediæval medicine was dominated by two theories, which fitted together and reinforced one another. The first of these was Astrology, the supposed influence of the planets on human lives; the second was the Humoral Pathology, which ascribed all diseases to the excess or defect of one of the four humours—yellow bile or choler, black bile, blood, and phlegm. According to the first of these theories, not only was every human being under the jurisdiction of one or more of the planets, but also he showed in his physical constitution or corporature—his physique as we now call it—to which of the planets he was subject; so that mankind was classified on sight into the Jovial, the Saturnine, the Martial, the Mercurial, the Venereal, the Lunar or Lunatic, and the Solar; for the sun and moon were then included among the planets. Each of these physical constitutions was accompanied by a corresponding

mental constitution, and it is to these mental constitutions, or temperaments that we now refer when we speak, as indeed we seldom do, of a man as a jovial, or martial or saturnine, or mercurial person, or a lunatic. The jurisdiction of the planets over human dispositions was partly direct and was partly exercised through the humours, over which also the planets extended their sway. The humours abounded or were defective according as the sway of the planet that ruled them was powerful or the reverse, so that jovial and solar persons, in whom blood predominated, were sanguine; saturnine persons were bilious or, strictly speaking, atrabilious; martial persons, in whom choler or yellow bile abounded, were choleric; and venereal persons and lunatics phlegmatic. For some reason that cannot now be traced we have ceased to speak of venereal and solar persons, but we retain in common speech all the other terms, though we retain them with a grip that is much relaxed, and is still relaxing; and as far as we do retain them we use them in meanings departing a good deal from their original significations. What meaning they still retain, moreover, is limited strictly to the mental constitution or temperament, so that when we now use a term belonging to either set, as, for instance, jovial or sanguine, martial or choleric, we characterise by it a certain bent, or constitution, or disposition of mind, and not of body. By a sanguine person we mean no more than a person of hopeful, optimistic disposition; by a jovial person no more than a jolly, smiling, good-humoured, expansive person; by each astrological or humoral term we mean one mental quality and no more; but it was not thus that the names were originally bestowed. To our ancestors a temperament signified

the total mental constitution of a man, just as by physique we mean his total bodily constitution. The temperament meant no single quality, but the whole construction of the mind; and the significance of the astrological or humoral title was that it assumed certain specific combinations of mental qualities; it assumed that the mental qualities occur in certain sets, which are met with again and again in different people, of course with individual variations, but substantially true to type. Is there any ground for the supposition that mental qualities do, in fact, thus occur in groups specifically alike? We must remember that this is a matter that requires no microscope or spectroscope, no knowledge of chemistry or physiology, to determine. It is to be determined by the mere observation of human nature as exhibited in individual men and women, and for this observation our forefathers were just as well equipped as we are. For such observations of human nature the ancient and mediæval physicians possessed every facility that we possess now, and they were not distracted by having to observe a great multitude of things that we must observe. What they have left on record shows that in many things they were very shrewd and acute observers, and although we cannot accept the astrological and humoral theories that they invented to account for what they observed, we need not on that account reject their observations. We need not empty the baby out with the bath water. The evidence of these latter days goes far to confirm the observation of the ancient and mediæval physicians, that mental qualities do tend to occur in groups, that there are different temperaments, some very distinct, marking their possessors off from the rest of mankind, others less

distinct; some constituted by a cluster of many qualities, others by few; and that though a temperament is not always present in its purity, or in high degree, yet when it is so present, the persons who possess it present a likeness in mental characters to one another such as is rarely presented by the different members of a single family. This being understood, we will now describe some of the more pronounced temperaments.

Chapter I.

THE ARTISTIC TEMPERAMENT.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that an artist necessarily possesses the artistic temperament, or that the possessor of this temperament is necessarily an artist. Many artists are very respectable and worthy persons, as excellent in morals as they are in ability; and the man of artistic temperament is usually neither respectable nor worthy, and is never excellent in morals, though he has often a fair share—sometimes a considerable share—of ability. The man of artistic temperament has in common with the artist his sensitiveness to sensuous impressions, his appreciation of beauty and grace, of sound, colour, and form. He is a potential artist, and usually is more or less an actual artist in an amateur way; but he has not the industry or application to become an artist in the full sense. He may and usually does, produce verses, essays, drawings, pictures, music, and other artistic products; but whatever he produces is stamped with the ineffaceable mark of the amateur. It is important not to confuse the artistic temperament with the temperament of the artist, which is a very different thing, and a much greater thing.

If every man embodies the traits of some animal, and will at his death be reincarnated as the animal whose

nature he shares, then the possessor of the artistic temperament will undoubtedly spend the next phase of his existence as a cat. He has the cat's self-absorption and aloofness from his fellows; the cat's indifference to social ties and obligations; the cat's sleekness and sedulous care of its person; the cat's incapacity for steady industry, and habit of acting by fits and starts; the cat's luxuriousness and self-indulgence; the cat's fondness for play; and usually the cat's dishonesty and cruelty.

The man of artistic temperament has usually been a spoilt child, and no doubt a good deal of the undisciplined excesses of his adult life are due to the want of discipline in his childhood; but his traits are inborn, and though judicious discipline in childhood might subdue them, no discipline would eradicate them. Very often in his childhood he has been puny; his health has been delicate, and so he has been indulged, has escaped the wholesome discipline of school, and has been excused from many a punishment that a healthy child would have suffered. Often he is the only son, and has been indulged on this account: often he has had a doting mother: often he has lost his father in early life; but though these conditions all favour the development of the artistic temperament, they do not create it. The disposition is inborn, and though it may be minimised by a sound and judicious bringing up, or fostered by an indulgent and foolish education, there is no reason to suppose that it can either be created or eradicated.

The artistic temperament is certainly not strongly hereditary, and it may be doubted whether it is hereditary at all. It may appear sporadically in one member of a large family, the rest of whom are normal; it may

appear in children in whose parents it is absent, and may be absent in the children of a father who possesses it in high degree. It is more frequent in men than in women ; but whatever its origin, it is a calamity to the family of its possessor, though it is not necessarily a calamity to the possessor himself. It does often bring him to irretrievable disaster, it is true, but it does not necessarily do so ; and the very selfishness that is an integral and conspicuous element in it may, if combined with a moderate share of prudence, secure for its possessor that ease and comfort for which he most craves, and make his life, if not prosperous or successful, at least enjoyable. He does not always wreck his own life, but if the temperament is highly developed, he will infallibly wreck the lives of others.

For the keynote of the artistic temperament is selfishness, the dominant is self-indulgence, and the sub-dominant sensitiveness to sensuous impressions. If men are divided into those who feel, those who think, and those who act, then the men of this temperament belong to the first class. They are, indeed, actors, but they are not men of action. They are actors in the histrionic sense. They pose and grimace. They constantly seek to attract attention and interest from others ; but they are not men of action. They are saunterers. They are lookers-on at the battle of life, and restrict their exertions to criticising and sneering at those who do the fighting. In as far as they act at all, their action is recreative. They are dexterous and nimble, and can do neatly and well many useless things. They are skilful at games, and so they should be, for they spend on games a very disproportionate share of their time. They have the musical faculty, and can

sing and play some musical instrument, perhaps several musical instruments, with easy dexterity. They draw and paint, write verses and plays and novels, may even be witty and brilliant in conversation; but whatever they do they do as amateurs. They are often very good amateurs, but they are no more than amateurs even in the profession they may adopt. To attain professional rank, even in an artistic or purely recreative avocation, such as that of the conjurer, requires persistence in steady industry; and of steady industry they are incapable. They will occupy themselves only as long as the occupation is pleasant and congenial to them. The moment it begins to pall and become tedious, it is thrown aside. This is not work. It is occupation, but it is not work, for work is doing that which is distasteful. If they work at all, it is by fits and starts, in snatches of brief duration; and in the doing they are inefficient, inattentive, procrastinating, dilatory, and leave their tasks half done. As long as the work has the attraction of novelty, they will pursue it with enthusiasm and energy, but they do not persist. As soon as it becomes tedious, it is abandoned. They are unmethodical. They have neither the foresight to devise a plan for themselves nor the tenacity to adhere to a plan made for them, and are too lazy to be orderly in business.

In business affairs they are unthrifty and extravagant. They spend disproportionately on present indulgence, on personal adornment and pleasure, and have little regard to future wants, and none whatever for the welfare of others, even of those nearest to them. They borrow without any intention to repay: they cadge without shame, and care not of how much they may deprive others, so that their own immediate wants are

satisfied. Anyone—father, mother, sister, wife, or even child—may work for them or want for them, and they take all that is given to them as their natural right, for which they express no gratitude, for they feel none ; and for which they neither own nor feel obligation. In the extreme instances of this temperament, even the ordinary obligations of morality are not acknowledged as binding or applicable to themselves, though they are quick to resent any relaxation of these rules by which they may suffer. Such persons will rob, and forge, and swindle without any acknowledgment, without, it seems, any realisation, that they are doing wrong, or that they are doing anything that their victims have any right or reason to resent ; nor do they express or feel any gratitude to the relatives who rescue them from the legal consequences of their depredations. So far from being grateful for what is done for them, they are resentful and indignant that more was not done.

As none of them is sensitive to the demands of honour, and some are indifferent to the obligations of honesty, it will easily be believed that they are no devotees to truth. They are, indeed, facile, plausible, and unblushing liars, and display little shame or embarrassment when their lies are exposed. They seem not to appreciate the difference between truth and falsehood. They lie and brag about their own achievements, for they are always conceited; and they lie in disparagement of others, for they are always envious of those who are more successful or more esteemed than themselves. The same selfishness and laziness that underlie their action in important matters secure that they are wanting in manners ; for good manners and courtesy mean un-

selfishness and willingness to take trouble in little things. To a new acquaintance, indeed, especially if they have anything to gain from him, they can for a time be fascinating, for they are ready of tongue, and their sensitiveness to impressions endows them with tact; but as in other things, so in this, sustained effort soon becomes wearisome, and they cannot keep it up. To the feelings of those whom they have no motive to propitiate they are frankly indifferent, and care nothing whether they merely jar upon the taste, or whether they outrage the deep consciousness of right and wrong.

The character that is here described as that of the artistic temperament is not an attractive one, and perhaps may be considered to be painted in colours too gloomy; but there are few who cannot reckon among their acquaintances one or more to whom the description applies. The possessor of this temperament has few redeeming features to set off against his defects, nor are his good qualities very important. For a time, and until his egotism asserts itself, he can be very entertaining and charming. He is a ready talker, sometimes a witty talker. He can talk entertainingly—chiefly about himself, it is true—but he can talk entertainingly, can organise games and amusements, and take the lead in them; but here, as a rule, his accomplishments end. He is an acquisition at a dinner party or a picnic, but in any of the serious affairs of life he is a clog and a hindrance, if no worse. These superficial and flashy qualities stand him in good stead. There is no one half as objectionable who is so much considered, who has so many allowances made for him, who is so generally excused, who is so often forgiven, who finds so many to

plead for him, who escapes so many of the just consequences of his acts.

Several reviewers have taken me to task for attaching the name of the Artistic Temperament to this unattractive set of qualities, but the responsibility is not mine. I found the name already current. I can trace it to no book, no written record, but it is current in the mouths of men, and I have often heard it alleged in excuse or in explanation of some mode of action that the actor possesses the Artistic Temperament. All I have done is to describe at length the peculiarities to which I found the name already attached. It is true that the name is not descriptive, but I know of no name that would be descriptive. Sir Ronald Ross suggests the Vain Temperament, and no doubt vanity is a very large ingredient in the mental make-up of these people; but it is not all, and heartlessness is even more predominant.

The man of Artistic Temperament is usually clever, but he is always incapable, and this leads us to the very important distinction between cleverness and capability, which deserves separate consideration.

Chapter II.

CLEVERNESS AND CAPABILITY.

These two qualities are not antagonistic. They are often exhibited by the same person, and then that person is a successful person ; but they are often found apart. A clever person is not necessarily incapable, nor is a capable person necessarily stupid ; but still the qualities are quite different from one another ; they are quite independent of one another, and may be developed to very different degrees in the same person ; so that we are often surprised to find how very incapable a clever person is, and how very capable a person who has no claim to be considered clever may be.

Cleverness is much more easy to find than capability, and is much less valuable. Everyone is clever now, and cleverness is a drug in the market ; but capability is far less frequent, and the demand for it never slackens. It is rather remarkable that cleverness should be so much more frequent than capability, for cleverness is an inborn quality. If a man is not born clever, no education and no training will make him clever ; but everyone may train himself to become capable. Capability is, indeed, natural to some persons, and seems to be innate in them, and if not innate it may be inculcated by a proper training ; but no training will make a stupid person clever.

In his mental operations the clever boy is ready, quick, nimble. His verbal memory is good, and he learns easily. At school he is high in his class, takes a high place in examinations, and carries off many prizes. The capable boy, if he does not happen to be clever also, makes no mark at school; but he does not fail in after life. The distinguishing character of the capable person is that he singles out the main point and sticks to it. Having once decided on a purpose, he keeps that purpose steadily in view, co-ordinates all his efforts to attain it, and doggedly refuses to be diverted into side issues. Therefore he is trustworthy. What he undertakes to do he will do.

The clever man is fertile in devising new ways of meeting circumstances. He likes novelty for its own sake, and will rather try a new method that promises a great but uncertain success than the old tried method that is certainly successful, but is probably tedious. A clever man may be capable also, but he is not always capable ; and when he is not, he is more ornamental than useful. The clever man is usually admired ; the capable man is always valued. The clever incapable is a very common character, and this is much to be deplored ; for, as already said, anyone may become capable who chooses to make himself so. Capability can be acquired, and it should be one of the main objects of education to see that it is acquired ; but unfortunately it is but little inculcated in schools. The clever incapable, if he is a barrister, is fluent and impressive, abounds in argument, is copious in his references to cases, ready to take objections, ingenious in finding technical flaws in his adversary's case ; but he does not go to the heart of the matter. His arguments, clever as they are, are not

addressed to the main point; his cases are not strictly relevant; his objections, even if they are sustained, do not matter; the flaws he discovers in his adversary's case are not in the substance of the case but in the fringes. He makes a brilliant display, but he loses his cause. If he is a general, he devises a brilliant plan of campaign against his enemy, but he does not consistently adhere to it. He allows himself to be diverted from it into making discursive attacks on tempting openings—attacks that, even if they succeed, do not materially affect the campaign, and meanwhile lose time and dissipate his forces. If he is a man of science, he is fertile in hypotheses which he does not trouble to verify. As a surgeon, he devises new and ingenious operations, which he executes with deftness and dexterity, for diseases that could be cured without operation. As a physician, he treats, in novel and striking ways, symptoms rather than diseases, diseases rather than patients. In his interest in devising new ways of doing things he loses sight of the relative importance of the things to be done.

The clever shopman amuses his customers with his chatter, and surprises them with his information—the capable shopman sells his goods. The clever incapable nurse will entertain her patient with interesting conversation—when he ought to be asleep. She will arrange the flowers beautifully—and leave crumbs in the bed. She can make *pot-pourri*—but she cannot boil an egg. She knows enough about doctoring to criticise the doctor under whom she works—but there are things about nursing that she does not know. The clever person has always an excellent excuse for things going wrong or being left undone, and the clever incapable is in constant

need of excuses. The capable person has no excuse ready, but then he does not need an excuse; for with him things do not go wrong, and are not left undone. If we give a job to a clever person, we know that if it is done it will be done neatly and dexterously, but we have no great confidence that it will be done in time, or that it will be done at all. If we entrust it to a capable person, it may not be done as neatly or as well, but we know that it will be done, and done in time.

The clever person knows a great many things, but his knowledge is apt to be inaccurate. The capable person may not have as wide a field of knowledge, but what he does know he knows thoroughly; and though his knowledge may be confined to his work, it extends to the whole of his work. The clever incapable may have a great range of knowledge of things outside his work, but there are things about his work that he does not know. The clever man has a good verbal memory: the capable man has a good business memory. The clever man remembers what he has read: the capable man remembers what he has to do. He may forget dates, but he remembers prices; he may forget the difference between the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Right, but he remembers the difference between a bill of exchange and a promissory note: he may forget the chemical formula of strychnine, but he remembers the difference in appearance between strychnine and Epsom salts: he may forget when the East India Company expired, but he does not forget when his licence to drive a motor-car or the lease of his house expires. He may be unable to read Greek, but he can read a map. He may be unable to write Latin, but he can write clear instructions. The clever traveller

discovers a short cut to his destination, and is apt to arrive late or lose his luggage on the way: the capable person may content himself with the old route, but he gets there in time and carries his luggage with him. The capable traveller does not miss his train or get out at the wrong station: the clever traveller is apt to do one or the other, though he may be very entertaining to his fellow-travellers.

Clever people are apt to make mistakes and go wrong because their attention is discursive. It ranges over many subjects, and is easily diverted from the thing that matters. From this lack of concentration it results that they do not think matters out. They are deficient in foresight, and do not reckon on contingencies that are likely, but are out of the routine. Capable people concentrate their attention on the matter in hand, think it out in all its bearings, and let nothing interfere until everything likely to happen is provided for. For this reason it is not easy to take them by surprise. When there is a hitch, when things do not go as they should, the clever man has to decide on the spur of the moment, and is apt to be flustered and go wrong; but the capable man has reckoned on things turning out unexpectedly, and has made his dispositions beforehand, so that if they do, he is not taken by surprise. The clever man is apt to presume on his ability to work quickly, and so to make up for lost time; only to find that he has lost more than he can make up. The capable man does things in the order of their importance, and so is prompt, while the other is procrastinating.

An excellent example of the contrast between cleverness and capability was recently recorded in the *Times*

by Dr. Broadbent. At the International Congress on Infantile Mortality held at Berlin in 1911, the German machinery for the purpose appeared to the visitors from this and other countries to be 'wonderfully impressive' and 'absolutely perfect.' The English and American visitors were 'struck dumb with admiration' and 'well-nigh green from envy.' The English visitors were mortified at the contrast with the methods in London or any part of the United Kingdom. But upon enquiry it was found that all this machinery, 'wonderfully impressive' and 'absolutely perfect' as it was, produced no result at all in diminishing the mortality among infants; whereas the methods adopted in this country, imperfect and clumsy as they appear, had actually reduced the rate of infantile mortality by twenty-five per cent. The Germans were clever, but the English were capable. The Germans set out to achieve a certain aim, and lost themselves in a wilderness of appliances—very clever appliances, no doubt, but appliances that did not achieve their purpose. The Germans allowed themselves to be diverted from their main purpose, of preventing infant mortality, to follow the subsidiary purpose of devising elaborate machinery; and in following this subsidiary purpose they lost sight of the main purpose. That is the mark and the characteristic of the clever incapable. He does very well indeed what is not worth doing; or if worth doing at all, is only worth doing for the sake of some ulterior purpose which he completely forgets and does not achieve. The English concentrated their attention on the main purpose, and achieved it. That is the difference between cleverness and capability.

Chapter III.

THE TEMPERAMENT OF THE ARTIST.

As has already been said, the temperament of the artist is very different from the artistic temperament. The respects in which they differ will appear in the following examination. They are wholly different temperaments, but they are not wholly incompatible. An artist is no more than other men immune from the artistic temperament. He may have a certain infusion of it, and in as far as he is infected with it he is in so far less capable as an artist. The artistic temperament exists in all grades and degrees, and is far from being always present in its full development. An artist, like anyone else, may be besmirched with some small degreee of it, but many artists, and nearly all the greatest artists, are entirely free from any trace of it. There is no trace of the artistic temperament in Shakespeare, Milton, or Cervantes; in Purcell, Beethoven, Mozart, or Mendelsshon; in Titian, Rembrandt, Reynolds or Turner; in Fielding, Scott, Jane Austen, or Thackeray; in Michael Angelo, Canova, or Flaxman; but Byron had it, Whistler had it, Charles Reade had it, Savage and Wagner had it in high degree.

There are many definitions of art and of the artist, but there is none that will stand examination. The definition or description of art that is at present most in vogue is that it is 'self-expression.' If this is so, then a display of ill-temper is art, for a display of

ill-temper is certainly self-expression. It is perhaps this definition or description that persuades the man of artistic temperament that he is an artist, and that the more he expresses himself—that is to say, the less he exercises self-control, and the more he yields to the impulse of the moment—the greater artist he is. This description of art as self-expression is not merely erroneous; it is pernicious; and it is necessary to find some more satisfactory formula.

Whatever else art may be, it is certainly creative; and the artist, whatever else he may be, is a creator. He does that which no one else has done, and which has never been done before. But stop! Is not the engraver, who copies another man's pictures, an artist, even though he is a copier? Is not the pianist or the violinist an artist, even though he but reproduces the creation of another mind? Yes and no. The engraver is not an artist if he but slavishly copies the painting. The pianist or the violinist is not an artist if he but mechanically reproduces the work of the composer. But the engraving becomes a work of art when the engraver, by the exercise of his creative faculty, adds to the engraving qualities which compensate for the loss of colour, and so makes of the engraving not a mere mechanical copy, but in some respects a new creation. The musician may, it is true, be a mere mechanical instrument to reproduce sounds in certain combinations and in a certain order; but he is no artist unless he reproduces those sounds in such a way as to add to them new meaning, and thus to create for us something we have never experienced before, even though the music he plays may be familiar enough. The artist is creative. He has originality. He puts things before

us in a new light. The thing that he presents to us may indeed be familiar, but he represents it to us in a way that is new. He is a creator. Is it, then, a sufficient definition of the artist to say that he is a man who creates new things? Clearly it is not, for the inventor also creates new things; and yet the artist and the inventor though they have something, perhaps much, in common, are not the same. The discoverer is also, in a certain sense, a creator; and discovery and invention go hand in hand. Yet we should not call Watt or Bessemer or Kelvin an artist; still less should we so denominate Newton or Darwin. Clearly, although the artist is necessarily a creator, yet he is not the only creator. He is a creator in a certain field only. Some creations are artistic: others are not.

Evidently, those creations which we call inventions are creations in the realm of utility. The inventor creates that which is useful; but what do we mean by useful? Do we mean that which increases our comfort, which adds to the amenities of life, and brings new pleasures within our reach? Scarcely, for the artist also does this. By that which is useful we mean that which assists us to attain our ends, that which enables us to attain our ends with less expenditure of effort, or that which brings new ends within our reach; in short, that which opens the way to new pleasures. The pleasure that we gain from an invention is not in the contemplation of the invention but in the use of it; and this is the difference between invention and art. For the pleasure that we gain from an artistic product is not in the use we make of it, but in the contemplation of it. An invention is a means to further ends: an artistic product is an end in itself.

The artist, whatever the medium that he works in and moulds to his purpose, is one who produces what is pleasing in the mere contemplation ; and this pleasure in contemplation is the end that he sets himself in his creative work. Now, pleasure in mere contemplation is a luxury that we cannot afford until more urgent wants are satisfied. It is an occupation for idle hours, an occupation that is an end in itself and leads to nothing further; and hence the development of art keeps pace with the increase of leisure amongst those who are capable of enjoying art. This undeniable association of art with leisure leads those of artistic temperament to suppose that by living a life of leisure they are cultivating art ; but this is a very erroneous view. The thorough enjoyment of artistic products demands leisure, it is true. The very busy man, the man whose whole time and energies are absorbed in the struggle for existence, has no leisure to read poetry, to hear music, to witness the drama, and so forth, and some leisure there must be before these artistic products can be enjoyed ; but no leisure went to the creation of these artistic products. The artist himself must live, and does live, a very laborious life. Whatever his material, whether language, pigments, building materials, sounds, marble, bronze, or his own elocution and gesture, the artist must serve a long and laborious apprenticeship before he can attain that complete and facile mastery over his material which will enable him to produce the effects he desires. It is this capacity for long and laborious industry, the fruit of self-restraint, self-control, and self-denial, that so eminently distinguishes the artist from the man of artistic temperament. Carlyle described genius as an infinite capacity for taking pains.

The description is ridiculous. If it were true, every ant and bee would be a genius, for no creature has so great a capacity for taking pains; but the description has this justification, that without great precedent labour no work of genius ever was, or can be, produced. Great capacity for taking pains no more constitutes genius than a strong wrist constitutes a good fencer, or a pair of legs constitutes a good rider; but it is true that without a strong wrist a man cannot be a good fencer, without legs he cannot be a good rider, and without great capacity for industry he cannot be a great artist; and this it is, in the main, that distinguishes the artist from the man of artistic temperament.

Granted this great capacity for industry, which the artist must possess, but which is by no means peculiar to the artist, what other qualities go to make up the temperament of the artist? As an artist he is to produce something that pleases by the mere contemplation of it. His industry has given him mastery over his materials, but what further qualities must he have to direct this industry toward the desired result? Whatever gives pleasure by the mere contemplation of it must be something that arouses emotion. To arouse emotion it must express emotion; and to express emotion it must be the expression of emotion felt more or less vividly by the creator while he is creating it. Hence the artist must be capable of experiencing emotions. No doubt everyone is capable of experiencing emotions in circumstances calculated to produce emotions; but in such circumstances the emotions are too forcible to allow us to attend to their expression, and the expression is correspondingly crude. In poignant grief, in extreme terror, in racking anxiety,

in glorious joy, we are too much overwhelmed with the emotion to be able to give to it adequate expression. To do this we must stand aloof and feel, not the emotion itself, but a pale yet accurate image of it, which we must imagine to ourselves. It is this power of imagining emotion in all its complexity, but in attenuated intensity, that lies at the root of the temperament of the artist. He must have the dramatic faculty of placing himself in an imaginary situation, of imagining accurately but faintly how a person really in such a situation would feel, and then of expressing those feelings so as to make them intelligible to a spectator, and so as to arouse in him the emotion, not that would be felt by the actual actor, but that is felt by the artist himself. It is from the contemplation of the expression of emotion, and from experiencing the emotions of a spectator of the actual scene, that the pleasure of witnessing artistic products is derived.

The merit of an artistic product depends on two factors; first, the depth or elevation or volume of the emotion expressed; and second, the skill with which it is expressed. Shallow and trivial emotion makes but trifling art, however perfect the technique with which it is expressed. Noble emotion of great profundity, expressed crudely and inadequately for want of mastery of technique, is not great art. It is an unsuccessful attempt at great art. The greatest art is that in which the noblest emotion is expressed with the most perfect technique.

To attain perfect technique in any art, laborious industry is necessary; but laborious industry alone is not enough. There must be in addition innate aptitude, aptitude that varies, of course, with the

medium chosen for the expression. Without this innate aptitude, no industry will give mastery over technique: without industrious study and practice no aptitude is of much avail. The combination will give exquisite technique, but technique alone will never make a man an artist. In addition, he must have the capacity of realising and picturing emotion. He must be capable of experiencing the emotion that he is to represent.

Many of these are not expressible in words: they have no intellectual equivalent: they can only be felt, and, if expressed, must be expressed inarticulately; and these are the emotions that find expression especially in music and in some forms of architecture; but some of them can also be expressed in gesture, demeanour and facial alteration; and therefore, in the depicting of these on canvas and in the solid, the more profound and stirring the emotion the higher the art.

One more quality must be added in order to complete the temperament of the artist. This is the ability to construct an harmonious and consistent plan. Whatever the medium in which the artist expresses himself, whether he is a poet, a dramatist, a novelist, a musician, an architect, a painter, a sculptor, an actor, or what not, each work of art that he produces must be modelled upon a consistent plan. It must have one leading and dominant feature to which all the rest are subordinate and subsidiary in various degrees, with which none must be discordant, and to which none must be irrelevant. The simpler the plan, the more harmoniously its parts are interrelated, and the more variously the different parts illustrate and corroborate the central theme, the greater the work of art.

Chapter IV.

THE ENVIOUS TEMPERAMENT.

'Wrath is cruel, and anger is outrageous; but who is able to stand before envy?'—Prov. xxvii. 4.

Envy and jealousy are often used interchangeably, as if they meant the same thing. In fact they are profoundly different. Envy regards one person only, and one person directly. Jealousy regards the relation between two other people. Envy is felt towards him or her who is more fortunate than the envious; jealousy towards him or her who is preferred by some third person to the jealous. In jealousy three people are concerned; in envy only two. Envy and jealousy often go together, but they do not necessarily go together, either in the sense that they are felt towards the same person or in the sense that they are felt by the same person. The envious person is not necessarily a jealous person, nor is the jealous person necessarily envious; but nevertheless the two temperaments often go together.

In the Litany we pray to be delivered from envy, hatred, and malice, and all uncharitableness; but evidently the form of the prayer leaves it doubtful whether we pray to be saved from experiencing these passions, or whether we pray to be saved from being the object of them. Either fate is undesirable, and we may well pray to be saved from both. In

experience we find that hatred, malice, and uncharitableness are included in envy—included, not as a species are included in a genus, but as ingredients are included in a pudding. They are parts of its composition. Envy is, in fact, that hatred, malice, and uncharitableness that is cherished towards those who are more fortunate than the envious. The envious poor man hates the man who is richer than himself; the envious plain woman woman hates the woman who is better looking.

People are not usually envied for what they have achieved or earned. They are envied for that which the caprice of fortune has bestowed upon them. If the man is envied for his achievements, he is envied, not for achieving it, but for the opportunity which came his way. The more of merit that has gone to procure for him the good things of life, the less he is envied for them. It is the unearned, unmerited good fortune for which he is envied. The envier is outraged by a sense of injustice. Why should unmerited, unearned good fortune come to another rather than to him! He is not absolutely worse off for the good fortune of another, but he is relatively worse off; and the sense of injury rankles in his mind. The natural effect of injury is to provoke retaliation; and since the person who feels himself injured by the good fortune of another cannot retaliate upon the good fortune, or upon the chapter of accidents that bestows the good fortune, he seeks to retaliate upon the recipient of the good fortune. The envious man hates the envied, and 'hates anyone the man he would not injure?' The envied man is always in jeopardy from his envier. The retaliation usually takes the form of detraction. Commonly the very fact that the envied is more favoured by fortune than the envier

lifts him out of the reach of more serious forms of injury and detraction is the only weapon left to the envier; but envy has this curious peculiarity, that it is apt to express itself not only—perhaps but slightly—in attacks upon the envied, but also, and more, in attacks on innocent third parties. The envious person is consumed by a rage of hatred against the envied, and if the envied is out of his reach, he will strike blindly against anyone who happens to be within his reach. His unfortunate family are his chief victims. Some piece of good fortune has befallen one of his acquaintances, from whom he must, in spite of himself, conceal his envy, and whom perhaps the laws of good breeding compel him, in spite of himself, to congratulate; and the suppression of his passion weights the safety-valve and increases the internal pressure to the bursting-point. As soon as he finds himself where he can safely blow off steam, he lets himself go, and then woe to his unfortunate subordinates and dependants! They are amazed by an exhibition of temper for which they have given no provocation, and the source of which is unknown to them.

If the envious person has no dependants, he, or more often she, for this mode of expressing envy is more frequent in women—is apt to sulk, and the sulkiness is sometimes pushed to such surprising extremes as to raise doubts of the sanity of the sulker. Her family are astounded when the sulker, without rhyme or reason known to them, will refuse to speak, will refuse to eat, will lock herself into her bedroom for days together, will go without fire in the depth of winter, will mortify herself and render the whole household uncomfortable, to all appearance from mere caprice, and

without provocation or justification of any kind. Such conduct is scarcely sane—it seems so motiveless. But if we could dive into the mind of the actress, if we could extract a candid and complete confession from her, we should find that she has a motive, and that the motive is a frenzy of envy. Such women or girls are usually obstinately dumb during these attacks, or if they break silence, it is only to utter some viperish vituperation; but if we are vigilant, we shall often notice a chance word which gives the instructed mind a clue, and reveals a consuming, raging envy as the underlying motive of the outbreak.

'A man that is busy and inquisitive is commonly envious,' so says Bacon. By 'busy' he meant busy in a sense now obsolete, or rather, in the sense of 'busies himself'—that is to say, meddling. Bacon's wisdom is much over-rated. He is one of those men who, like Plato, Aristotle, and Mill, have reputations out of all proportion to their deserts. Here he puts the cart before the horse. It is not that meddling and inquisitive people are commonly envious, but that envious people are commonly meddling and inquisitive. Their consciousness of their own merits is a raw surface which is scarified by having the merits of others brought to their notice; and yet they cannot help tormenting themselves by meddling and inquisitive investigation into the business of other people. In as far as these inquiries discover the defects and misfortunes of other people, in so far the meddler is a happy man or woman; but alas! his investigations may bring to light only the merits, or the unmerited good fortune, of their subject, and then the envier writhes in torment. But he does not desist. He still hopes to find something

to give him consolation, so he still meddles and inquires. Bacon is much nearer the truth when he says ' Neither can he that mindeth but his own business find much matter for envy.' Here he is unquestionably right. Envy arises from the contemplation of other people's fortunes, and the man who confines his attention to his own business is precluded from envy. ' Men of noble birth ' he says ' are noted to be envious towards new men when they rise. For the distance is altered ; and it is like a deceit of the eye that, when others come on, they think themselves go back.' In this he gets near the truth of the matter, that envy arises out of comparison. It is excited by the comparison of the better fortune of others with our own worse fortune. ' Lastly,' he says, ' near kinsfolk and fellows in office, and those that are bred together, are more apt to envy their equals when they are raised.' This is true, but Bacon does not see why it is true. Such cases are peculiarly provocative of envy because there is no ignoring them. They thrust themselves upon our notice, and must be attended to. And, moreover, the comparison is more insistent. We are not compelled to compare ourselves with those who are far from us, who are not personally known to us, and with whom we have had little to do ; but we cannot help comparing ourselves and our fortunes with those immediately around us; and it is as true of envy as of hatred, of love, and of other personal passions, that frequent personal intercourse is necessary for their development in full strength. However bitterly we may hate a man, the hatred dies away if he goes to India and we never more hear of him. That absence makes the heart grow fonder is only true when the absence is brief.

Envy includes hatred, but it is not the same as hatred.

It is a conditioned hatred, and the hatred lasts only as long as the conditions last—that is to say, as long as the fortune of the envied continues to be better than that of the envier. The hated man is still hated even in misfortune ; but let the envied man meet with disaster, and he is no longer an object of hatred. The hatred was conditional, and now the condition is abolished, the hatred goes with it. The envier is quite capable of showing kindness, nay, he finds a genuine delight in showing kindness to the man in his misfortune whom he envied in his good fortune. Envy is the result of comparison, and the result of the comparison is now favourable to the envier, so that he envies no longer ; and so delighted is he at the relief to his feelings which the new situation brings, that he is quite capable of active benevolence. Indeed, envy is quite consistent with benevolence and beneficence towards any object that does not inspire envy ; and the further removed the object is from inspiring envy, the more unmistakably and decidedly worse off the person contemplated than the contemplator, the more active and the more genuine the benevolence of the man who bears nothing but ill-will towards those who are better off than himself.

Chapter V.

THE JEALOUS TEMPERAMENT.

The difference between jealousy and envy was outlined in the last chapter. Envy is aroused by the contemplation of but one other person : jealousy depends on the relation between two other persons ; and it is curious that although jealousy is a very widespread passion, to which everyone is liable in some degree, a passion which affects not only mankind, but many of the lower animals also, and frequently produces disastrous consequences, yet the double attitude of the jealous person has never become embodied in language. A man is said to be ' jealous of ' the other man to whom his girl shows an inclination, but there is no phrase to express the corresponding feeling that he entertains towards the girl.

The type of jealousy is sexual jealousy, but jealousy is by no means exclusively sexual. The sycophant is jealous of the person to whom his patron shows inclination. The admiring schoolgirl is jealous of the other girl to whom her adored mistress shows inclination. The child that passionately loves its mother is jealous of the new baby on which the mother lavishes caresses. The basis of jealousy is the desire for the exclusive possession of the love, interest, or attention of another person, which the jealous person desires to hold in

monopoly; and jealousy arises when this monopoly is infringed. Of the love, the interest, the concern, the attention of another person the jealous regards himself as the proprietor, and his jealousy is excited when his proprietary rights are infringed. Thus jealousy is but a special case of a much more general passion. The type of the jealous person commonly accepted is the man whose girl prefers another man; but a more general type is the dog snarling over a bone. The dog regards the bone as his own property, to which he has the right of exclusive possession, and he is ready to defend his right, and to attack anyone who presumes to infringe it; and he proclaims this readiness by his snarl, which is a threat of retaliation upon anyone who presumes to interfere with his proprietary right. So the man feels that the affection, regard, concern, and attention of his girl are his own property, to which he has the right of exclusive possession: he is ready to assert his right, and attack anyone who presumes to interfere with it. The man of jealous temperament is he who has his sense of proprietorship strongly developed, and is sensitive to any interference with it—nay, to any approach to interference, to any possibility or presumption of interference. The jealous dog does not wait until an attempt is made to rob him of his bone; he snarls at the passer-by who is not thinking of him. And the jealous man does not wait to feel jealousy until his exclusive possession is actually interfered with: the mere approach to interference, the possibility of interference, is enough to excite his jealousy.

Jealousy, then, is the feeling that is aroused in us by interference with our proprietorship. It is usually taken as limited to interference with our proprietorship

in the affection and regard of a person of the opposite sex, but the feeling thus aroused is indistinguishable from that aroused by diverting the affection and regard of anyone, even of the same sex, and is not widely different from the feeling aroused by interference with any other mode of proprietorship. To use a man's horses or motor-car, or his camera or cricket-bat, or to smoke his cigars or drink his wines, without his permission, arouses in him an emotion which is scarcely distinguishable from jealousy.

Jealousy, therefore, is by no means dependent on love. It is often associated with love, but it is not necessarily so. Even sexual jealousy may be felt without any intermixture of love. It is by no means unusual for a woman who does not care a straw for her husband, who may even detest him, to be frantically jealous of his attentions to other women. It is not the outraged love that provokes jealousy ; it is the infringement of proprietorship. Little as she cares for her husband, she has a strong sense of her proprietorship, not over him, but over his attentions, and if they are directed elsewhere, her jealousy is aroused.

Nor is jealousy by any means exclusively directed towards persons of the sex of the jealous, or towards persons at all. A husband of jealous temperament will be jealous of the man towards whom his wife seems to incline, but he will also be jealous of her woman friend, of her and his own children, even of her lap-dog or her cat. A jealous wife will be jealous not only of her husband's women friends, but also of anything that engrosses a share of that attention to which she lays exclusive claim. She will be jealous of his men friends, of his yacht, his golf, his books, his gun, even of his

business, for all of these steal from her a portion of that attention that she seeks solely to engross.

The natural manifestation of envy is, as we have seen in a previous article, retaliation against the envied person, but is by no means restricted to this mode of expression. If such retaliation is impracticable, or even in addition to it, the envier vents his spleen on innocent third parties, or perhaps, by a strange distortion of purpose, punishes himself. The expression of jealousy is no less diffused and multiplied. It provokes to retaliation; and the retaliation may be directed against either the person or thing towards which the jealousy is felt, or against the person or thing on account of which the jealousy is felt, or against the jealous person himself, or, though more rarely, against an innocent fourth party.

The most natural manifestation of jealousy is retaliation against the intruder—against the person who has nfringed the proprietorship of the jealous person, or what he conceives to be his proprietorship—a conception often formed on very inadequate grounds. The person towards whom the jealousy is felt may have taken no active step against the proprietorship, may be ignorant that it has been infringed, may be ignorant that there is any proprietorship, or that any is claimed. A woman may be furiously jealous of the woman to whom her husband or her lover appears to be attracted, even though no such attraction is in fact felt, even though the other woman is ignorant of it if it is felt. A ludicrous instance of jealousy has recently come under the notice of the writer, an instance in which a man conceived a furious jealousy of another who had written upon a subject which the jealous man regarded as his own

property; and this although the intruder was totally ignorant that the jealous man had written on that subject, and although others had written on it before the jealous man had done so. But however groundless the jealousy, however absurd the grounds that give rise to it, it is one of the most lethal of the passions, and more often than any other passion prompts to acts of deadly animosity. Although the person to whom the jealousy is directed is an object of this animosity, he is not the sole, nor even usually the chief object. In sexual jealousy the retaliation is more often directed upon the person on account of whom the jealousy is felt, than towards the person of whom the jealousy is felt. Of the hundreds of assaults committed on the prompting of jealousy that come before the courts every year, but few are committed upon the rival, and these much more often by the jealous woman than by the jealous man. The jealous man does not as a rule assault his rival; he beats his wife or his girl, or cuts her throat. The jealous woman does not as a rule assault her husband or her lover. She seeks out her rival and scratches her face, or perhaps throws vitriol over her.

What would be very surprising if it were not so familiar is that jealousy so frequently prompts the jealous man to injure, neither his rival nor the woman who has given, as he thinks, occasion for jealousy, but himself. That he should try to get his rival out of his way is intelligible: that he should punish the woman who has transferred her allegiance is intelligible; but that he should punish himself, often with capital punishment, is indeed a strange vagary. When he has murdered his faithless wife or lover, it is perhaps not un-

natural that he should kill himself, both to forestall the punishment of the law, and because he has now deprived himself of that which made his life most worth living; but that he, or more often she, should kill herself for the motive of jealousy is less explicable. It can be explained, however, by the consideration that has just been mentioned. The deprivation of her lover deprives the girl, for the time being, of her whole motive and purpose in life. Life is to every man, and still more to every woman, not a gift, but a trust, to be handed on to a succeeding generation. Unknown to herself, unrealised by herself, the craving for motherhood dominates her being. As long as the future has in store for her the realisation and satisfaction of this craving, even if only in possibility, she can endure in hope and tranquillity; but when, by the securing of a lover, she has been brought within sight of the realisation of her hopes, and when, by his desertion, the cup is dashed from her lips, all interest in life is abolished, and she hastens to quit the scene that is become distasteful to her.

Jealousy, in some degree, is natural to man and woman, and all possess it more or less; but in the jealous temperament it assumes a dominant influence. The man of jealous temperament is furious if his wife but shows interest in the conversation of her partner at a dinner; the woman of jealous temperament is furious if her husband is even commonly polite to a lady guest. Persons of this temperament may be quite aware of the groundlessness and absurdity of their jealousy. They may deplore it and despise themselves for it; but for all that it dominates them, and they cannot help it.

Chapter VI.

THE EMOTIONAL TEMPERAMENT.

The whole feeling and tradition of English life is antagonistic to the emotional temperament, which is held nowhere in such disrepute and disfavour as in this country. We regard the facile and ready display of signs of emotion as a feminine characteristic, unworthy and derogatory in a man ; and if, as there is good reason to suppose, that nervous system is the most highly developed and most highly organised in which the control and inhibition of the higher centres over the lower are the most complete, there is much to be said for the English view. When we say English, we include also the lowland Scotch, who are of the same original stock, which is in them less mixed by successive infusions of alien blood ; and we exclude the Celtic fringes, in which the same tradition does not obtain, but in which, on the contrary, the emotional temperament is highly developed. Thackeray draws for us the picture of a perfect servant, who waited punctually at table, cleared everything away, and when all his duties were performed asked permission to go home, on the ground that he had received information that his house was on fire. Thackeray does not draw the inference, but we know quite well that the man was an Englishman born and bred. He was not

Scotch, for who ever heard of a Scotch butler, at any rate out of Scotland? And it is to be presumed that if there were any Scottish butlers they would be found in England. Nor was he Irish or Welsh, for apart from the rarity of butlers of either nationality in England, an Irishman or a Welshman would have rushed into the dining-room immediately on receipt of the news, would have explained with much gesticulation and little coherency the nature of the disaster, and have rushed out again to the scene of it, leaving the dinner and the dinner-things to take care of themselves.

It is no part of the task of these papers to apportion praise or blame. They are purely descriptive, and in no degree didactic. It is open to any reader to decide for himself which course of conduct he considers more proper in the circumstances; and there is no doubt that while that described by Thackeray will be generally approved in England, with an approval that increases as we travel northward, it will be regarded in the Celtic fringes as incomprehensible, and by no means to be admired.

The name of the Emotional Temperament describes it, at least in part. Its possessors express their emotions readily and strongly. There is no reason to think that they feel more deeply or more acutely than the unemotional, but whatever they feel they must express. They must express it at once, and strongly, often, it seems, more strongly than the feeling needs or warrants. They are deficient in reticence, in self-restraint, in self-control. Their emotions are near the surface, and are

constantly breaking through the surface and becoming plain to the bystander. The expression of their emotions is set off by a hair trigger, and often, indeed, goes off at half-cock. They are prone to express emotions, and to express not only what they feel, but often more than they feel.

Emotion is expressed in various ways; in facial expression, attitude, demeanour and gesture, in voice, articulation and speech; and in all these ways the emotional person expresses himself, often with exaggeration.

The common mode of expressing the emotions of depression is by weeping, and hence emotional persons are readily moved to tears. They weep on small occasion, freely and unrestrainedly, loudly and demonstratively, with no attempt at repression. Saul, an emotional man, belonging to an emotional race, "lifted up his voice and wept." The description is admirably expressive. It displays the man's entire lack of restraint, his indifference to the presence of spectators. Nay, the presence of spectators was probably a stimulant to him to give rein to his feeling, An Englishman may weep upon occasion, but the occasions are very rare, and in no case would he lift up his voice and weep unrestrainedly. He would be ashamed, and would do his best to repress and hide the expression.

Emotion is expressed mainly in speech and in action, and in both ways the emotional person expresses his emotions readily, with freedom, and with exaggeration, often running into extravagance. In speech, he is prone

to the use of strong expressions and superlatives. Emotional persons are perhaps more numerous than they used to be, and form a larger proportion of the population; at any rate, the misuse and degradation of strong and superlative expressions is become much more frequent of late years, possibly because of the permeation of the country by the Celtic fringes. Such words as awful, perfectly, infinitely, absolutely, frightfully, and so on, have been so misused and vulgarised that they have lost their intensitive meaning, and have almost lost their meaning altogether. The emotional person uses them perpetually. He piles Pelion on Ossa. He would drink up Esil, eat a crocodile, worship mighty Mumbo Jumbo in the Mountains of the Moon; but his emotion evaporates in talk, and his performance falls far short of his declared intention. He is apt to say more than he means, and much more than he will stick to.

For the emotional person is by nature untruthful. He is untruthful in both ways—that is, he says carelessly and unthinkingly what is not in accordance with fact, not recognising or not admitting the desirability of truthfulness, not caring whether what he says is true or not; and besides this, and no doubt on account and by reason of this, he often lies in the second of Dr. Johnson's senses. He lies, and he knows he lies. His assertions are, like all his expressions, exaggerated; and they are variable. What he has said one minute he will unsay the next. Self-contradiction has no terrors for him. He cares little for being detected in an untruth, for he has no proper appreciation of the value and beauty of truth.

He is constitutionally inaccurate. You cannot believe a word he says.

But his use of emotional speech is so frequent that he is fluent. He gains by constant practice an easy mastery over words and phrases. He is always fluent of speech, and his fluency often rises into eloquence. The emotional races, the Irish especially, are renowned for their eloquence. We are far from saying that eloquence is restricted to the emotional temperament. Were we to say so, the single case of John Bright would be enough to refute us ; but undoubtedly eloquence and even oratory are frequent among the emotional, infrequent among the reticent, the self-controlled, the self-contained. The emotional orator easily becomes a demagogue ; and the majority of demagogues have been of this temperament. Their appetite for expression grows with their opportunities for expression, and when they are on their feet addressing a sympathetic audience they are apt to be carried away, to say far more than they intended to say, to advance to positions they never meant to occupy. If the emotional orator is addressing an emotional audience, the consequences cannot be foretold, but it is certain that they will be momentous. We see the result in revival meetings, in which the effect of emotional eloquence on an emotional audience is heard in shouts and ejaculations, and seen in weeping, in swooning, and even in convulsions among the audience. We see it also in the terrible destruction wrought by a mob of emotional malcontents addressed by an emotional demagogue.

In action, the emotional person is impulsive. Wanting as he is in self-restraint, he does not wait to act until he has balanced the advantages and disadvantages of action. He is wanting in circumspection and deliberation. The path from feeling to action is short-circuited. As the emotional cannot bear pain without howling, so they cannot bear suspense, which is a kind of pain, without a struggle to relieve it. They cannot wait. Accustomed to express their emotion as soon as it is felt, they must express it so in action as well as in words, if it is susceptible of expression in action. They want results immediately, and they think that, even in the most complicated affairs, results may be attained immediately. They rush direct for their goal, not recognising that in complicated affairs, and especially in social affairs direct action is usually the direct route to failure. They are too impatient to think out in detail an elaborate scheme requiring time to bring it to maturity, and needing scrupulous attention to detail to ensure its success, so they rush at some crude project, and are content to take credit for good intentions, and to lay the blame of failure upon those who have to execute an impossible task.

Emotional people act upon impluse. This does not necessarily mean that their action is sudden or abrupt. An abrupt action may have been well considered and thought out beforehand, and considered and well-thought-out acts are the opposite of impulsive. An impulsive act may have been long determined on, and postponed until opportunity presented itself. The mark of impulsive action is not suddenness or abruptness, but want

of due estimation of the advantages and disadvantages of the act. The emotional person is impatient. His emotion burns to express itself in action. He is long accustomed to let his emotion boil over in action, and he cannot wait to consider, so his action is immediate and direct. He will rather jump out of the window than go down the staircase; he will rather splash through the pond than go round by the bank; and the consequence is that in the first case he is apt to break his leg, and in the second to get out of his depth. The emotional person is, in fact, very generally out of his depth With a light heart and an ignorance of consequences he lets loose forces that he cannot control or direct. He launches crude and undigested schemes that produce all kinds of results except that which he intended. The most dangerous person in the world, the fertile source of incalculable and innumerable mischiefs, disasters, and injustices, is the well-intentioned enthusiast who is also an emotional person.

Enthusiasm is the great motive power of humanity, and without it no great unselfish project was ever carried through. Enthusiasm held in hand by self-restraint and guided by sound judgment has given us every great discovery, every difficult invention, every new religion, almost every great benefit that humanity has received, from geometry to porcelain, from the theory of gravitation to the steam-engine, from natural selection to electricity; but the unrestrained and unguided enthusiasm of the emotional temperament has been responsible for most of the great disasters from which

the human race has suffered. The emotional enthusiasm of St. Bernard and of Peter the Hermit sent many hundreds of thousands of men and women to their death in the Balkan peninsula, before Constantinople, and in the sands of Palestine; the emotional enthusiasm of Torquemada produced the horrors of the Inquisition; the emotional enthusiasm of Innocent VIII. initiated the horrors of the witch mania; the emotional enthusiasm of John Law floated the Mississippi Scheme; the emotional enthusiasm of Harley blew up the South Sea Bubble; and in our day emotional enthusiasm has produced the ludicrous fiasco of the Increment Tax and the chaos of the Insurance Act.

Chapter VII.

THE SUSPICIOUS TEMPERAMENT.

The suspicious temperament shows itself to the observing eye in early life, but nevertheless it is often overlooked at this stage, and even when fully developed in early manhood receives insufficient attention. It is important, however, that it should be recognised, for it is apt to develop into one of the most intractable and dangerous forms of madness.

The child of suspicious temperament is different from other children. He is not given to sociable and boisterous play, but prefers to sit or ramble by himself, indulging in reveries and castle-building. He lives in an imaginary world of romance, in which he is, of course, the central and heroic figure. He is studious, and usually has a fair share of ability, so that he takes a good place in his class, and is well thought of by his masters; but he is not popular with his schoolmates. He keeps aloof from them, and they reciprocate by sending him to Coventry, not formally and designedly, but practically. Schoolboys are, as a rule, cruel little brutes. They are cruel, not of set purpose, but from want of sympathy. As the embryo starts as an unicellular organism, and passes through the various stages of development that the race has passed through in its progress from the unicellular organism to man, so the child after birth passes through the various stages of human develop-

ment that are traversed by man in his progress from the state of savagery to that of high civilisation. The young schoolboy is a savage, and as he grows older gradually emerges from savagery into barbarism. In both stages he is cruel, and in both stages he shares with the savage and the barbarian their detestation and contempt of the stranger and the independent, non-conforming person who departs from the wonted and accepted ways of customary and common life. The schoolboy who refuses to conform to schoolboy usages, but strikes out an independent line of his own, is not popular with other schoolboys, and is made to feel his unpopularity not only in being sent to Coventry, but also by more positive action, which is the sweetest sorrow to the boy of suspicious temperament. He glories in feeling that he is under-estimated, misunderstood, unappreciated, and misjudged. He does not complain, but he hugs his misery, indulgies in orgies of self-pity, retires more and more into himself, and accentuates his singularity.

When he leaves school and goes out into the world, he is already a morbid being. He is self-centred, and his interests and attention are not externalised, but turned inward upon himself. More and more he becomes peculiar and different from other men, and if we can penetrate into his mind, we find at the bottom of his peculiarity a colossal conceit. He is in his own opinion the cleverest, the ablest, the best, the handsomest, the most deserving of men. And yet he cannot disguise from himself that his successes and achievements are by no means proportionate to his merits. For this he has an easy and manifest explanation. He is still under-valued, misjudged, misunderstood, under-estimated.

His ill-success is due to no deficiency of his own, but to the ignorance, jealousy, favouritism, and malice of other people. The defect is not in his own achievements, which are splendid enough, but in the stupidity or malice of others, which cannot recognise, or refuses to admit, his superiority. He does not complain loudly, but he adds this new grievance to the reckoning, and scores another injustice against mankind.

He is subject to the little annoyances and troubles that beset us all, but he takes them much more seriously than other people, and attributes them to different and more sinister causes. Does he mislay a thing? He is sure it has been stolen. But it is of so little value that it is not worth stealing? Then it has been stolen out of malice, and for the purpose of annoyance. Does an acquaintance pass him in the street without recognising ing him? He is sure he has been intentionally cut. He has long suspected that acquaintance of unfriendly feelings towards him, and now his suspicions are confirmed. Does a tradesman make a mistake in executing an order for him? Such carelessness would not be allowed towards anyone else. Other people can be properly served. Other people's orders are executed with care, but he is considered of no account. It does not matter how he is served. Anything is good enough for him. Is one of the breakfast eggs bad? It is sure to fall to his share, and he will never believe that it fell so by accident. It was arranged that he should have it, or at least it came to him by some gross negligence that would have been avoided in the case of anyone else. And so he goes through life; always ill-treated; always selected and singled out for ill-treatment; always the victim of a carelessness and negligence that would

never have been exercised towards anyone else; or worse, of malice, and of malice resting upon envy of his manifest superiority. But he does not complain—much. He prefers to hug his grievances, to pose as a martyr, to accept his slights and injuries with an ostentatious resignation that is more theatrical than Christian; or if he does display resentment, his resentment takes the form of sulks rather than of active anger. But if the fire does not blaze up brightly, it is none the less intense. It glows and smoulders in sullen internal fury, which may at length blaze out in raging flame, upon a provocation that is perhaps trivial in comparison with others that have been passed over.

If it goes no further than this, the suspicious temperament may be regarded as still restricted within the bounds of the normal; but it is not always thus restricted, and at best it is the normal representative or degree of a mental peculiarity that, when exaggerated so as to pass beyond the bounds of the normal, becomes one of the most striking, the most peculiar, the most dangerous, and the most incurable kinds of insanity. From imagining a constant succession of slights, injuries, injustices, and neglects to imagining a common cause for them all is a not long step. It is indeed almost a logical step. So many repeated experiences of the same kind are hardly consistent with fortuitous occurrence. If they really were, as the man of suspicious temperament believes, intentionally directed against him, it would look very much as if they were directed on a common plan from a common source; and gradually this conviction forces itself upon the suspicious man. He sees in every new occurrence of the kind, and almost everything that happens to him is to him an occurrence of the kind,

fresh evidence of the existence of a plot against him. If we are much associated with him, we may witness the gradual conversion of the suspicion into a rooted conviction. Little by little we see a conjecture grow into a suspicion, the suspicion becomes more and more confirmed until it ripens into complete certainty. Then the delusion of persecution is established; then the boundary of sanity is passed; and then whatever of reason there may have been in the suspicions, which was never very much, is scattered and abandoned. The morbid growth in the mind still continues, and there are now no bounds to its extravagance. Formerly some real annoyance, however slight, was needed in order to arouse the resentment. Now annoyance, and wilful, intentional annoyance, is attached to the most harmless and innocent occurrences, to occurrences that have no connection at all with the suspecting man. In every word, in every gesture and attitude of other people, he sees intention to injure him, or evidence of the plot to injure him. The casual greetings of strangers in the street have some reference to him and to the plot against him. The school children shouting at their play, and regardless of his presence, are jeering at him. Even the articles in the newspapers, while purporting to criticise the Prime Minister or the Home Secretary, really refer to him, and are using these personages as cover to attack him. The whole world is pressed into the service of the plot, and is utilised by his enemies to injure him. What astonishes us in all this is the colossal conceit that underlies it all. According to the diseased imagination of the paranoiac, he is the centre of universal attention. If his imaginings were true, the thoughts, the interests, the efforts and endeavours of the

whole parish, the whole country, the whole world, are concentrated upon him and absorbed in him. In his eyes the rest of creation is as interested in him as he himself is, and devotes to him all its time and attention. This also is carried to its logical conclusion. If he is so important that everyone is thinking of him, and interested in him, he must be some great personage; and accordingly he soon begins to imagine, first that he must be, and then that he is, a great personage. It is true that he occupies a very insignificant position, but this is because he is kept out of his rights by the machinations of his enemies. It is probable, and it soon becomes certain, that he was changed at birth. He is not the son of a city clerk or a country parson as he has always appeared to be. He is really of ducal, nay, of royal birth. He is the rightful heir to the throne. He should be by rights the actual occupant of the throne. He may go further than this, and arrogate to himself the attributes of the Deity. There is no limit to his arrogance or to his assumptions. Such is the culmination of the suspicious temperament if its vagaries are allowed to proceed unchecked; and it is very difficult to put any curb upon them. The foundation of the temperament is conceit, and the most effectual way to take the conceit out of a man is to secure that he shall have plenty of traffic with the world, and shall be brought into contact with many men, each of whom, we may be sure, will excel him in some respect or other; but with the man of suspicious temperament this is difficult, for he is unsociable and solitary in taste and habit. The only method that offers much hope is to catch him young, to recognise and combat the peculiarity while he is still a child.

Chapter VIII.

THE RELIGIOUS TEMPERAMENT.

The root of religion is sacrifice; the primary purpose of sacrifice is propitiation. In primitive religions the gods are frankly malignant. They are inspired by malignity, and only by sacrifice can they be propitiated and induced to forgo the execution of their malevolent designs. As men become more enlightened, the malignity of their gods becomes mollified, and at length Christianity attempts to depict the Deity, not as an avenger, for ever on the watch to inflict pain and suffering in revenge for offences committed against Him, but as a loving Father, desiring only the welfare of His votaries. This is the professed ideal of the Christian religion; but it is never maintained. At the one extreme the Roman Catholics teach the necessity of propitiation by penances interspersed among the pleasures of life; at the other extreme, the Puritans teach the necessity of propitiation by renouncing pleasures altogether.

The religious temperament consists, therefore, in proneness to sacrifice, which is evinced in two ways—self-sacrifice and vicarious sacrifice; and, accordingly, the religious temperament is twofold. At the one extreme we see St. Simeon Stylites and the noble army of self-martyrs, the self-torturer, the hermit, the Trappist, the monk, the nun, and so on down to the High Church

lady who deprives herself of sugar in her tea during Lent, or rises at an inconvenient hour to attend early celebration. At the other extreme is the savage who immolates his human victim on the altar, the inquisitor who tortures his heretics to propitiate his Deity, and the Puritan who deprives his children of innocent pleasures for the same reason. No doubt in many cases the two forms of sacrifice are practised by the same person. No doubt Abraham, in intending to sacrifice his only son, was torn to the heart with anguish at the necessity; no doubt Torquemada inflicted penances on himself; and the Puritan father who deprives his children of their innocent little pleasures may deprive himself also of pleasures equally innocent; but the vicarious sacrifice is so much less unpleasant that, human nature being what it is, it is apt to become preponderant; and as sacrifice, after all, is sacrifice, it may seem superfluous, and tending to foster self-righteousness and spiritual pride, to cultivate both forms. Hence the pleasures that the Puritan denies himself are apt to be those which, even if indulged in, would yield him little pleasure, while those of which he deprives others inflict very real mortification. His abstention from dancing, at his age and with his portly figure, is no great sacrifice to him, but his prohibition of the same exercise for his children is for them a real deprivation.

The preponderance of vicarious sacrifice over self-sacrifice cannot take place without a certain callousness on the part of the sacrificer to the sufferings of others, and callousness is a half-way house on the road to cruelty; and thus is explained that streak of cruelty which is so frequent an accompaniment, and, indeed, a manifestation, of the religious temperament. Not all

persons of this temperament are cruel; far from it. Many are of the most benevolent and amiable disposition, but these are not addicted to vicarious sacrifice. They sacrifice themselves. They give freely of their money, their time, their labour, their thought, their convenience and comfort, either to forward the welfare of others or *ad majorem Dei gloriam;* but they do not demand sacrifices from others. Rather, by their own unselfishness and readiness to sacrifice themselves, they foster selfishness in those around them. It is those who make vicarious sacrifices, those who demand and exact sacrifices from other people, and especially those who make themselves the instruments of other people's sacrifices, that are apt to become first callous and then cruel, and at length may develop or degenerate into such monsters of cruelty as Torquemada, Bishop Bonner, John Calvin, and Samuel Wesley.* Not satisfied with the sufferings they are able to inflict and to witness, their malignant imaginations revel in describing the torments of hell, to which they hope rather than fear that their victims will be consigned. Cruelty is not a necessary part of the religious temperament, but it is a frequent accompaniment of this temperament; and it is found, as has been said, in those who prefer to make vicariously the sacrifices that are the root element in religion.

Those examples of the religious temperament that tend to self-sacrifice provide us with some of the most beautiful and admirable specimens of human character, just as those that tend to vicarious sacrifice provide us with some of the worst; but even self-sacrifice may be pushed to excess, and will then become a vice. Even those beautiful characters that compel our admiration

* Wesley's treatment of his erring daughter was devilish.

by their unselfish devotion to others are not always beneficial to those others. The more a person sacrifices himself, or more often herself, to ministering to the comfort and welfare of others, the more likely is he or she to breed selfishness in those others; and in experience we find that the most selfish people are those upon whom unselfishness has been most lavished. Self-sacrifice does not, however, always take the form of increasing the comfort of others by renouncing our own. In many cases there is mere renunciation for its own sake, or rather, for the sake of compensations that are expected to accrue after this life; and it is in these that we see the most extreme degrees of self-sacrifice—of self-sacrifice that often amounts to self-torture. As it is difficult to withhold our admiration from the self-sacrifice of unselfishness, even though its effect may be to increase the selfishness of others, so it is difficult to bestow admiration upon this kind of self-sacrifice, which is in many cases but a refined and excessive selfishness. The monk and the nun who renounce the pleasures and comforts of what they are pleased to call the world, and who renounce them, not in order to be of service to their fellow men and women, but in order to shirk the burden and the battle of life, and to secure for themselves a better future in the world to come, do not command our admiration or our sympathy. They are engaged in a commercial transaction, which they believe will turn out to their profit, and we admire them no more than we admire the trader who embarks on a speculation for the sake of the return that it will bring; or, if we do, the admiration is rather for their astuteness than for their virtue.

Religion and morality are very different things, and

although the man of religious temperament may be a moral man, true and just in all his dealings, there is no necessity that he should be so, nor is it at all necessary that a highly moral and virtuous man should be religious. Religion and morality have no more necessary connection than blueness and hardness. The sea is blue, but it is not hard, and the diamond is hard, but it is very rarely blue. No one can doubt that the Duke of Alva, Louis XI., Louis XIV., Philip II., and James II. were extremely religious, and no one can doubt that every one of these historic characters was a scoundrel. On the other hand, Julian the Apostate, though by no means a religious man, was far from the worst of the Roman Emperors, and many a philosopher whose life was blameless, and who is revered as a model of virtue, has had no religion at all.

Neither is intelligence any monopoly of the religious temperament: there are as many stupid people as clever people who are religious, and as many clever people as stupid people who are not. There is, indeed, a certain antagonism between reason and the religious temperament. Those who possess this temperament in high degree are apt to flout the processes and results of reasoning, and refuse to admit their validity in the realm of religion; and many very able men of religious temperament refuse to employ their intellect on religious problems.

The religious temperament is, however, strongly addicted to forms, and strongly infused with emotion. Devotion to form grows with the age of the religion, and the oldest religions not only are the most formal, but also come at length to consist mainly, and at last entirely, of forms. Each religious revolt is a revolt

against the rigidity of form, but no sooner is form abolished than it settles down again and continually grows stronger. Ritual, liturgy, observance, convention, are characteristics of all religions, and the older the religion the more it is bound in these forms. Even the Quakers, who profess to throw off all forms, substituted new forms for those they abolished. They abolished all peculiar ecclesiastical costume, only to institute a conventional costume of their own ; they abolished the liturgical mode of addressing the Deity, only to introduce a conventional mode of addressing their fellow-men. If they have now abandoned both their conventional costume and their conventional mode of address, it is not because their religion is become less formal, but because they have become less religious.

The religious temperament is an emotional temperament. It is diffused and surcharged with emotion, which finds ready and enthusiastic expression. This does not mean that every professional religious person, every priest, parson, minister, monk, nun, dervish, fakir, and bonze is emotional, for many persons who adopt religion as a profession are not of the religious temperament, just as many persons who adopt business as a profession are not of the business temperament ; and *vice versâ*, there are many persons of business temperament who are not in business, and many of religious temperament who are not in religion. But the person of religious temperament is prone to feel strongly, and to express his feelings with even exaggerated emphasis. The emotion may not be deep, nor need it be enduring, but while it lasts, it overpowers him and carries him away in a storm of expression. He weeps on small occasion

He groans with remorse. He writhes in contortion of agony at the thought of his sins—or of other people's. Under stress of exhortation and contagion he shrieks and sobs, and may fall down in a faint or even in convulsions. He gushes with pity, especially with self-pity. He sees visions and hears voices. Under stress of emotion he breaks out into eloquence of which his ordinary speech gives little promise. So foreign are these manifestations to his customary behaviour that they may be looked upon as the direct results of inspiration. They are, however, the common features of the religious temperament when it is highly developed.

Chapter IX.

THE HISTRIONIC TEMPERAMENT: THE POSEUR.

But all their works they do for to be seen of men.—Matt. xxiii. 5.

Macaulay says, in a well-known passage, that the first William Pitt "had one fault, which of all human faults is most rarely found in company with true greatness. He was extremely affected. He was an almost solitary instance of a man of real genius, and of a brave, lofty, and commanding spirit, without simplicity of character. He was an actor in the Closet, an actor at Council, an actor in Parliament; and even in private society he could not lay aside his theatrical tones and attitudes." Even his most intimate crony could never obtain admission to his chamber "till everything was ready for the representation, till the dresses and properties were all carefully disposed, till the light was turned with Rembrandt-like effect on the head of the illustrious performer, till the flannels had been arranged with the air of a Grecian drapery, and the crutch placed as gracefully as that of Belisarius or Lear." It is a little odd that Macaulay, with his unsurpassed and unsurpassable memory, and writing in 1834, only a few years after the death of Napoleon, "the gleam of whose glory arose and o'ershadowed the earth with its

fame," should have spoken of Pitt as an almost solitary instance of habitual histrionic display by a man of real genius. Macaulay was too able a man to have shared the vulgar prejudice of so many English contemporaries of Napoleon, that he was not a man of genius, but a mere histrionic charlatan. Macaulay was too able to make this blunder, and too honest to pretend that he had forgotten the instance. Probably, like the consummate literary artist he was, he deliberately refrained from placing near the object he was depicting another of equal prominence that would have diverted attention from his main theme. A memory such as his could easily have furnished him with other instances also of men of real genius, at any rate of great ability, who were so habitually given to theatrical display as to serve as instances of the Histrionic Temperament.

Why Napoleon Posed.

And there was a better reason for refusing to cite the instance of Napoleon. Napoleon did frequently pose, no doubt. He did very often adopt the tones and attitudes of the actor, and strut and gesticulate for to be seen of men; but not on that account was he necessarily a Poseur. When Napoleon posed, he posed deliberately and of set purpose in order to achieve an end that he had in view, and that could best be achieved by posing. Most Frenchmen are born actors, in the sense that they can act effectively upon occasion, and every Frenchman appreciates good acting, admires the actor, and esteems him more highly if he acts well. Napoleon was a consummate judge of men, and was fully aware of this trait in the French character, and he took

advantage of it. He wished to impress Frenchmen and to be popular amongst them and admired by them, and he neglected no means that were likely to serve his purpose: therefore he posed; and he posed, as he did everything else, effectively and well; but not on that account was he a Poseur.

Three Variations of Poseurs.

For the Poseur does not pose in order to achieve a purpose. He poses, not deliberately and upon reflection, in order to gain advantage by posing and gesticulating and grimacing. He poses because he cannot help it. It is his nature. He struts and gesticulates and strikes attitudes to impress the spectators, no doubt, but not, as Napoleon did, with any ulterior purpose beyond the mere purpose of producing an impression, attracting attention, and evoking admiration. He poses, not to achieve any outward purpose, but to satisfy an inward craving. It is his nature to come forward and seek to attract attention, just as it is the nature of the shy man to shrink back and elude attention. The two temperaments are antithetically opposed to one another, but each is a true temperament, born with the person who displays it, and not to be overcome without pains and trouble. The true Poseur poses because it is his nature to pose, because to do so is the natural expression of his inward craving, because he can no more help it than that born poseur, the peacock, can help spreading his tail and strutting before his dames, or that other born poseur, the mandril, can help turning away in order to display to the embarrassed spectator its scarlet and cerulean hinder end. Napoleon posed deliberately

and of set purpose, in order to achieve an ulterior end. Very likely he enjoyed posing, as we all enjoy doing that that we do well ; but he would still have posed even if it had bored him to do so, even if he had been obliged to learn how to do so ; and it is said that he did in fact take lessons in deportment from Talma, the leading actor of his time. The true Poseur poses because to him posing is delightful, because he enjoys it, because it exercises a faculty that he possesses in high degree, in overflowing abundance ; and the exercise of such a faculty, if we possess one, is a necessity of human nature.

Self-Consciousness and that Other-Consciousness.

Like the shy man, the Poseur possesses in high degree that other-consciousness that is paradoxically called self-consciousness. Both of them are acutely sensitive to the presence and attention of their fellows ; but whereas to the shy man the knowledge that he is attracting the attention of others is painful, embarrassing, and paralysing, to the Poseur it is delightful, enjoyable, and stimulating. The one is never at his best unless he is alone, and can do, free from observation and attention, whatever he has to do. The other is never at his best unless he is in company, and can attract to himself the observation and attention of his fellows. As with certain drugs, that which paralyses one man stimulates the other.

The difference between the unaffected man and the affected man, between the simple straight-forward person and the person who is, as Macaulay says, "without simplicity of character," is that the former acts with a

single eye to what he is doing: the latter has but one eye on what he is doing, the other being intent upon the spectators, to see how they are impressed by what he is doing. The one acts in order to get the thing done; the other acts partly to get the thing done, but mainly to impress the spectators with his manner of doing it, and with his success in getting it done. All their works they do for to be seen of men.

Unless an action is become automatic from perpetual repetition, the diversion of our attention from what we are doing is apt to deteriorate the work; and even if an action is become thoroughly automatic, though it may be spoilt by paying sedulous attention to its details, it cannot be performed with full efficiency unless attention, great attention, is paid to the general manner of doing. A musician who should try to pay attention to the performance of each individual note would infallibly ruin his performance, but a musician who should allow his attention to be diverted altogether from his performance might execute every individual note faultlessly, but the performance as a whole would be a failure. It would be inartistic. There would be no life in it. The critics would detect the failure at once, and their descriptions of the performance would be disparaging. That work to which we attend most closely is, other things being equal, the best done; and hence the person who rarely gives his whole attention to what he is doing rarely attains to the highest excellence in what he does. His performance is often mediocre, and sometimes altogether fails. In either case, the merit of the performance is out of proportion to the admiration that he asks for by his posing; and for this reason alone he may become an object of contempt.

Actions Which Excite Our Ire.

But even if he is not on this ground an object of contempt, the Poseur incurs the disapprobation and disesteem of those who see through his devices and recognise that he is posing. We feel that histrionic display is unworthy. There is something in it that goes against the grain of simple, straightforward people. We feel that there is something derogatory, something despicable, in the art and practice of posing, so that it excites in some degree our contempt, in some degree our ire. Why is this? It is for several good and sufficient reasons. In the first place, the strutting, the gesticulation, the grimacing, divert our attention from what we meant to attend to. We wish to attend to what is being done, and between us and the object of our attention something else is interposed, and the interposition is resented. The diversion of attention is resented. We want to attend to the performance, and our attention is constantly being carried away to the antics of the performer. The diversion of attention is annoying, and excites our ire.

In the second place, we regard the posing as a kind of imposture. It is an attempt to obtain admiration by false pretences. We feel that a man's claim to our admiration should stand upon his achievements, and that if his achievements themselves constitute a claim on our admiration, there is no need to claim that admiration, as the Poseur does, on other grounds. In this matter we have a right to form our own judgment, and we resent its being taken out of our hands and prejudged by an interested party. Moreover, we are very apt to suppose that if a man had a legitimate claim

to our admiration on the ground of his achievements, then, as there would be no need for a spurious claim, such as posing virtually is, no such spurious claim could be made. The reasoning is not always valid, as the case of the Earl of Chatham proves, but it commends itself to the judgment, and it is very often valid. It is usually valid.

A Sturdy Beggar.

A man's claim to our admiration should rest upon the solid ground of his achievements, and not upon empty and futile grimaces and posing. If he is content to let it rest upon his achievements, and if his achievements are such as we consider admirable, our admiration and applause are freely given; but we feel that they are free gifts, to be given or withheld at our own discretion and pleasure, and we resent being dunned and importuned for them as the Poseur duns and importunes us by his posing and his antics. We look upon him as a sturdy beggar, who demands as a right that which is our own to bestow or to withhold as we please. In this way also the Poseur incurs our displeasure.

Finally, the natural, simple man shrinks from the limelight glare of public attention. He may not be positively shy, but he has this in common with the shy man—that until he becomes well accustomed to it, he is embarrassed and confused by becoming an object of general attention. He may be flattered, but he is none the less embarrassed, and when he witnesses the embarrassment of another person in these circumstances he is full of sympathy for the victim. But when he discovers a man who does not wait for the limelight to be

turned upon him, but seeks it out, attracts it to himself, basks in it, revels in it, poses in it, and struts in it, then he looks upon that man as abnormal, as indeed he is. The normal spectator regards the Poseur with the suspicion, dislike, and contempt with which the stranger and the foreigner are always *primâ facie* regarded. We feel towards him as we feel towards the drunken man and the lunatic, as the townsman feels towards the yokel and the yokel towards the townsman. He is not our sort, and we are much inclined, on that account alone, to heave half a brick at him.

Chapter X.

THE SHY PERSON.

The shy person is much to be pitied, for shyness is a curse to its possessor. He suffers all the agonies of remorse without having experienced the pleasure of sinning, so that his shyness is unmitigated misery, and in its more pronounced degrees the shy temperament is a very serious handicap to its possessor in the struggle for life.

We call a shy person self-conscious, and say that he has an exaggerated and hyperæsthetic self-consciousness, but the description, though not altogether false, is not altogether true. It is insufficient and lays undue stress upon one part only, and that not the larger part of the malady. The shy person is unduly self-conscious, it is true, but he is much more other-conscious than self-conscious. His chief trouble is that he is morbidly conscious of other people, of their presence, and above all of their attention to him. To be in the presence of other people, especially of strangers, and in proportion to their strangeness, is to him uncomfortable and embarrassing. To be conscious that they are observing him, that they are paying attention to him, scorches him with agony. And the mischief is that he attributes to them the wish to observe and attend to him, and the fact of observing and attending to him, when they are thinking no more about him than about last year's

almanack. He is morbidly self-conscious, it is true, but he is also madly other-conscious, and this is the gravamen of his malady : this is the true source of his misery.

To be embarrassed by knowing that other people are paying attention to us is scarcely abnormal. It is the common lot of humanity. It is an extension and development of that inhibitory effect of all upon each which is the foundation of social life. No one but a lunatic can behave in the presence of other people precisely as he would behave if alone. We can neither eat nor drink, speak nor sing, sit nor walk before other people as we should do if they were not there ; and this inhibitory effect that is produced by the mere presence of others is intensified manyfold if we know or think that others are not only present, but are observing and attending to us. The effect is the greater the more numerous the spectators and the stranger they are to us. No one has any difficulty, or feels any embarrassment, in walking across a room. The action is so simple, so easy, so habitual, so automatic from long practice, that it is accomplished without effort and without thought ; but take away one side of the room and replace it by the auditorium of a theatre crowded with spectators whose collective attention is concentrated upon you, the sole occupant of the stage, and now do you find it easy and unembarrassing to walk across the room ? On the contrary, if you are not accustomed to perform under such conditions, you may find it impossible. In any case you find it very embarrassing, very confusing, and very difficult to perform even the simple act of walking in a natural and easy manner. You have suddenly lost the full power over your limbs. You can

move them, it is true, but you have no longer the full, easy, unconstrained command to which you are accustomed. Your movements are awkward and clumsy. You know that they are awkward and clumsy; and the knowledge that they are so, and that many people are witnesses that they are so, embarrasses you still more, and makes them more awkward and more clumsy. What is easier, more natural, less attended with either self-consciousness or other-consciousness than to chat with a friend or two over the fire or across the dinner-table? Who in such circumstances feels any awkwardness or embarrassment, any difficulty in arranging his thoughts or finding words to express them? But let the two or three be multiplied by a hundred, and let the cronies be turned into strangers; how now? If you are not a practised speaker, you will find difficulty, it may be much difficulty. You will gabble as long as words come to you, and when they fail, as they soon will, you will find your tongue paralysed, and, if words should at length come to you, you will be unable to utter them. The room swims before you. The sea of faces blends into one undistinguished blur. It needs only a titter to make you sink into your shoes or rush from the platform. If you have had on exceptional occasion such experiences as these, you have some taste of what the shy person suffers, not on exceptional occasion, but whenever he is where two or three are gathered together. What you feel with moderate intensity only when the attention of a considerable audience is concentrated upon you, he feels with great intensity whenever he is in the presence of others who might be observing him and attending to him, whether they are actually doing so or not. As in some people the eye is morbidly over-sensitive to light,

and in others the ear is morbidly over-sensitive to sound, or the skin morbidly over-sensitive to touch, so in the shy man the consciousness is morbidly over-sensitive to attention. It is one great raw, and the lightest touch upon it is agony.

The effect upon us of even the presence of other people, and still more of the knowledge that they are paying attention to what we do and say, is always inhibitory—that is to say, it checks, hinders, limits our activity. It is inexplicably paralysing. Pushed to excess, it becomes actually paralysing. It not only checks and limits our activity, both of body and of mind, but almost abolishes it. The mind becomes confused, obscured, embarrassed, and acts but slowly and erratically, or scarcely acts at all ; and the body faithfully reflects the state of the mind. Movements are tardy, awkward, and fumbling. Speech becomes difficult, disconnected, inappropriate to the occasion, even incoherent. That is what we may all suffer if the attention of many strangers is concentrated upon us ; this is why the shy person suffers if the attention of even a few strangers, if the attention of but a single stranger, is concentrated upon him. And the effect is intensified in a vicious circle. The sufferer is acutely conscious of his awkwardness and embarrassment, and the more he is conscious of them the more they increase ; the more they increase the more acute and painful his consciousness of them becomes, until at length in extreme cases he bursts into tears or rushes from the room in panic and despair.

The embarrassment of mind is reflected and expressed not only in conduct, but in organic changes also, and the chief of these, the proclamation of shyness and embarrassment to all spectators, is the phenomenon of

blushing. Blushing proclaims to the spectators the shyness and embarrassment that are felt in consequence of their attention, thereby attracts their attention and increases it, and thereby are themselves increased. The unhappy shy person who proclaims his shyness by blushing enhances his own misery fivefold.

No one but the shy person who blushes can appreciate or understand his misery. It is so acute, and seems so incurable that the consequences are serious. A shy person has been known to be exasperated by his shyness to the point of suicide itself, and though such extreme exasperation as this is rare, it is not at all rare, nor is it at all to be wondered at, that the shy person avoids the circumstances and occasions in which he experiences shyness. In other words, he shuns every occasion in which attention would be attracted to himself. He shuns publicity. He keeps himself private. He shuns meeting strangers. He narrows his acquaintances. He lives more and more to himself and by himself ; and as he has less and less experience of meeting strangers, less and less opportunity to experience their attention and become accustomed to it, he becomes more and more confirmed in his habit of shyness, which becomes more and more difficult to break. Such is one of the consequences of shyness ; but there is an alternative.

Shyness is sometimes interpreted as cowardice, but it is not necessarily accompanied by cowardice. Of what is called physical courage—that is to say, of the power to meet physical danger with a steady eye and hand, the shy man may have abundance. Fear of physical danger, which is what is usually meant by physical cowardice, he may be completely free from. In the presence of physical danger he may be as brave as a lion.

If by moral courage is meant the ability to meet with steady mind the disapprobation of his fellows, he may possess this also ; but he certainly does not possess the kind of courage that enables him to bear with equanimity the glare of their attention ; and he feels that, justly or unjustly, this inability may bring upon him the disesteem and reproach that attach to the coward. If he takes this view, and if he is in fact a courageous man, he will be apt to make some display in order to repel the imputation. Or it may be that being, as the shy man always is, acutely sensitive to this defect, and as the shy man not always is, determined to overcome it, to ignore it, and to behave as if it did not exist, he endeavours by active efforts to show that he is not embarrassed. He will not display his embarrassment, not he. He will cover it up and disguise it beneath a display of ease and self-possession ; and so determining he overacts the part. The embarrassment that he actually feels, in spite of the pretence that he does not, confuses his mind and impairs his judgment, so that instead of a display of ease and nonchalance he becomes boisterous, rude, audacious, ill-mannered, and lays up for himself an additional agony of remorse, to be experienced when the occasion is over, and he reflects in cool blood upon what he has done.

What, then, is the remedy for shyness ? What is the shy man to do in order that he may be shy no longer ? How is this failing to be overcome ? The remedy is simple, and is to be found by consideration of the cause. The shy person is shy in the presence of strangers only. Among his familiars he experiences no shyness. With those who are no strangers to him he feels no shyness and he is shy in proportion to the amount of attention

from strangers that is concentrated upon him; and, in less degree, but still in some degree, to the strangeness of the occasion. This being borne in mind, the means of prevention is obvious. Let him have no opportunity of meeting strangers, and let the opportunity be abolished not by abolition of the meetings, but by abolition of the strangeness. In other words, shy persons are those who in early life have had no practice and no experience in meeting strangers, and so having the attention of strangers directed to them and attracted to them. Something is due to innate constitution, no doubt. All children are shy when young, but some are born more shy than others; but, born shy or not, shyness can be prevented by accustoming children from an early age to meet all kinds of people. By custom strangeness is abolished. Custom and strangeness are incompatible, and in proportion as custom prevails strangeness is driven away. And shyness depends largely upon strangeness. Not wholly, for a number of strangers accentuates shyness; but consciousness of the attention of strangers is at the bottom of it. If the meeting with strangers becomes customary it loses its strangeness. The strangers are individually still strangers, but the occasion of meeting strangers is no longer strange, and when the strangeness is abolished, the shyness is abolished along with it.

What suffices for prevention suffices for cure also. Cure is much more difficult than prevention, and therefore no child should be allowed to grow up in the habit of shyness; but cure may always be effected by the same means that prevention can be effected—that is, by the shy person accustoming himself to occasions on which he experiences shyness. He will go through

agonies in the process, and the cure will take longer the older he is before he begins to practise it; but if taken in hand at any reasonably early age, the cure is certain. It needs courage. It needs grit and determination. It takes time. It may take years. But one fine day the shy man will wake to the delightful consciousness that his shyness is vanished.

Chapter XI.

THE VULGAR PERSON.

"Are you looking for a sharp knife, sir?" said the waiter to a guest who had left the table and was rummaging among the knives on the sideboard. "Allow me to sharpen one for you."

"No, you fool," replied the guest, "I am looking for a blunt one. Can't you see that I have just cut my mouth?"

A vulgar man to put his knife into his mouth! Certainly. It is vulgar because it is considered vulgar, because there is a conventional and arbitrary rule against it, because it is one of those things against which polite society sets a face of flint; but the inherent vulgarity of the guest was displayed not nearly as much in putting his knife into his mouth as in calling the waiter a fool. The first is conventionally vulgar, and on a change of fashion may become the height of good breeding; the second is inherently vulgar, and no change of fashion could deprive it of its vulgarity.

There are two kinds of vulgarity, therefore—conventional vulgarity and inherent vulgarity, or vulgarity of manner and vulgarity of soul; and of these the first is trivial and curable, the second is serious and incurable.

Vulgarity of manner consists in the breach of conventional regulations—some of them very absurd—

that have been enacted as inflexible rules, and are, in fact, mere fashions, as irrational as most other fashions, and subject to the fluctuations and changes that effect all fashions. If they were all reversed to-morrow no one would be any the worse, except that those who are now in the height of the fashion would be considered vulgar, but this would be balanced by the advantage of those who are now considered vulgar and would then become fashionable.

Vulgarity of manner attaches only to trivial acts, such as the pronounciation of words and peculiarities of dress, and they are violations of laws that rest upon no principle, but are mere whimsies, conformance with which serves to show familiarity with a certain class of society, and shows no more.

To call a clerk a " clurk " is gross vulgarity, for the word retains its old pronunciation. To call a girl a " gurl " while not actually vulgar, does show a lack of acquaintance with the usages of the arbiters of polite pronunciation. On the other hand, no suspicion of vulgarity attaches to calling the clergy the " clurgy," although the word is so very closely allied to " clerk." The aforementioned arbiters have decided that the old pronunciation of " clerk " must be retained, and that the old pronunciation of " clergy " must be altered ; but it is manifest that the decision does not depend upon reason. It is pure fashion. Very likely the vulgar have, in the case of " clurk," anticipated a change that the refined will make in time.

To omit the " h " at the beginning of a word is an offensive vulgarism ; but to omit the " g " at the end of a word is the height of refinement. Manifestly there is no reason in this : it is pure convention.

In these matters of what may be called modal vulgarity it is often difficult to distinguish between vulgarity, archaism, provincialism, pedantry, and eccentricity. To call a clerk a "clurk" is vulgar; to call the clergy the "clargy" is archaic. To say "I 'ave done it" is vulgar. To say "Ah ov doon it" is slightly vulgar, but mainly provincial; and to say "I hev done it" is provincial without any vulgarity. Not to sound the final "e" in "Lalage" is vulgar. To sound it in "diatribe" is pedantic.

Modal vulgarity, as I have called it, displays itself in the utterance of words more, perhaps, than in anything else; but it is shown in many other things, all trivial and without inherent importance. There is no vulgarity in wearing round your hat a ribbon not tied by yourself; but it is vulgar to wear round your neck a cravat you have not yourself tied, or that has not been tied by your valet. However comfortable it may be, you must not wear a straw hat with a frock-coat. It is vulgar. So, too, it is vulgar to give your card to the footman when you enter a private house, but it is not vulgar to give your card to the messenger when you enter an office.

The odd thing is that, though all these vulgarities of manner are trivialities, and do not detract in the slightest from the worth of the person who displays them, yet they are usually considered far more important than the vulgarities of the soul, which are infallible indications of a debased nature.

One of these major vulgarities is to attach more importance to vulgarities of manner than to vulgarity of mind. While we are in Rome, we should do as the Romans do, and if our associates are so foolish as to think better of us if we call a table-napkin by this, its proper name, than if we call it a serviette, there is no

reason why we should not bow ourselves in the House of Rimmon, and take the credit so easily gained; but what are we to think of people who attach importance to trifles like this, and see nothing vulgar in behaviour that hurts the feelings of other people, and betrays their own depravity of soul? True vulgarity consists in giving ourselves airs, in affectation, and in hurting, without provocation, the feelings of other people.

True vulgarity is inconsistent with naturalness of demeanour: true good manners are inconsistent with self-consciousness. It is the self-conscious person, the person who is perpetually speculating how his demeanour appears to other people, the person who is consciously acting for the purpose of impressing other people, who exhibits vulgarity of mind. The person who gives himself airs when he finds himself in a position superior to what he is accustomed to; the person who looks round for applause; the person who is on tenterhooks to shove himself forward; the person who does not appreciate that he is not wanted; the person who takes to himself more than his rightful share, whether of meat from the dish or of attention from the company; he is the true vulgarian. Beyond this there are deeper depths of vulgarity. One of the lowest forms of vulgarity is to make cattish remarks about other people, present or absent; and the lowest depth of all is reached when a position of authority is used to inflict humiliation and mortification upon a subordinate. Modal vulgarity can be cured by care, attention, and education: vulgarity of soul is inherent and incurable. The modal vulgarian may know that he is vulgar, and strive successfully to cure himself. The vulgar in soul are self-satisfied, and never realise their baseness.

Chapter XII..

THE FADDIST.

The faddist, or crank, is familiar to everyone. He is familiar because he insists on making himself heard and seen. He is a busy, meddling, intrusive person, who is not content merely to live and let live, but insists that everyone else should live as he would have them live ; in short, should adopt his fad. The faddist is a person who fixes upon some minor phase of conduct and exalts the cult of this mode of conduct into a religion, nay, into more than a religion ; for with most people religion nowadays occupies a very subordinate position among the objects for which life is lived, but the faddist lives mainly for his fad. He devotes the greater part of his life to its practice and advocacy, and to abuse and detraction of those who refuse to worship the god of his idolatry.

There are many fads, and many kinds of fads, some of them positive—that is to say, inculcating a certain practice ; others negative—that is to say, opposing a certain practice. Many of them are of very trivial importance, and none of them has a tithe of the importance that is attributed to it by the faddist. Of the positive fads, the most numerous are those which are supposed, on very insufficient evidence, to contribute to health. The health faddist eats strange food. He

lives on fruit and nuts, or toast and water; his fruit and nuts, or whatever the faddy food is, must come from a particular source of supply and be of a particular brand. His beverage must be measured to the thimbleful. If he drinks tea, it must draw for so many seconds by a stop-watch, and the milk must be sterilised. He wears strange clothes; he must or must not wear certain fabrics next his skin; his clothes must be of special material, of a special brand, and must be made by a certain tailor and no other. He wears no hat: or his hat must be of a faddy shape or faddy material, or both. He has a certain ritual of exercises: breathing exercises, exercises to strengthen the lungs, the heart, the stomach, the liver, the arms, the legs, and the rest of him; and this ritual he performs daily with all the zeal of a religious devotee, for to him it is a religion. He must chew each mouthful so many times, and cannot talk at meals because he is engaged in counting the movements of his jaws. All this he does to preserve a life that is not worth preserving: to keep in health a body that serves no useful purpose. His motto is *Propter vitam vivendi perdere causas.*

The negative fads are still more numerous and diversified. The negative faddist is anti-alcoholic, anti-carnivorous, anti-tobacconist, anti-vaccinationist, anti-vivisectionist, anti-patriotist, anti-bellumist. He is anti-restraintist, and would abolish the imprisonment of criminals, and the confinement of lunatics. If criminals must be imprisoned, in spite of his efforts to prevent it, they must at any rate be pampered. They must be allowed to have pianos and newspapers, beer and skittles. He is anti-scientist or anti-Christian; he is an astrologer, a neoteric Buddhist, a flat-earth crank,

a spiritualist, a telepathist ; in short, the faddist holds any opinion and advocates any cause of action you please so long as it is opposed to the general sense of the community.

Some of the opinions of the faddist might be held on reasoned conviction, and after examination of the evidence for and against ; but it is not thus that the faddist holds them ; and when so held they are not fads. The convictions of the faddist, if convictions they can be called, are the merest prejudices. Anything that runs contrary to generally received opinion appeals to him with irresistible force, and he is ready to adopt it without any consideration of the evidence : in fact, he is constitutionally incapable of weighing evidence, of suspending his judgment, or of entertaining doubts. If he has any knowledge at all that there are reasons against his opinion, he gains this knowledge from those who are already steeped in prejudice against the reasons, and take care to put them so as to render them ridiculous. The faddist is incapable of stating fairly an opinion contrary to his own, or a fact that traverses his opinion. He garbles, misquotes, distorts, and misrepresents facts, quotations, and opinions that are distasteful to him ; and when these expedients will not serve, he suppresses the evidence altogether. What reasons he gives for his faith are childish, but he is incapable of recognising their inconclusive character. The anti-alcoholic, for instance, is never tired of proclaiming that alcohol is not a food, and this is one of his stock arguments against the consumption of alcohol. When he has said that alcohol is not a food he sits down complacently with the conviction that he has said the last and the decisive word. Draw his attention to the fact that the same may

be said of tea and coffee, of ginger-beer and lemonade, and even of water, and you incur his detestation and abuse, but you do not shake his confidence in the conclusiveness of his argument.

The faddist has a very remarkable conscience. To any infraction of the fad his conscience is morbidly sensitive: it quivers with hyperæsthesia; but in the treatment of the adversaries of his fad it is shockingly callous. Rather than permit the slightest infraction of his fad he is willing to sacrifice the lives of his wife and children, and even, within limits, his own comfort. One distinguished anti-alcoholic faddist electrified the world by proclaiming that if his wife were dying and a drop of alcohol would save her life, he would not allow her to have it. He did not make the same promise for himself, if he should be in the same desperate condition; but then, of course, an expedient may be permitted, to save the life of a dignitary of the Church, that would be very improper if utilised for a mere woman, and that woman only his wife. Such an extreme sacrifice must not be expected; but it is certain that a faddist would put up with inconvenience, even considerable inconvenience, himself, rather than taste alcohol, or eat meat, or to wear an undergarment of cotton or linen or woollen, or infringe the sanctity of his fad, whatever it happened to be. But the sensitiveness of his conscience in this direction is balanced by its extraordinary callousness in treating opposition to his fad. The fad is to him the main end of life, and justifies any means that he may employ to uphold it, and to damage those who are opposed to it. In support of his fad, the faddist will conscientiously lie, perjure himself, slander and traduce his antagonists with eagerness and relish. Recognising

that the best mode of defence is counter-attack, the faddist considers it more important to carry the war into the enemy's country than even to spread his own fad; so that it may justly be said of, for instance, the anti-vivisectionist, that he is concerned not so much to save from pain the animals experimented on as to give pain to the experimenters. He condemns with ferocity the 'vivisection' of a rat, even though the vivisection may be but the infliction of a scratch or a prick; but he glories in practising moral vivisection on his opponent. He is a sentimentalist and a humanitarian, and has all the cruelty of these characters.

What particular fad the faddist may adopt is largely a matter of accident. He is a faddist by temperament, and his mind is so constituted that to him a fad of one kind or another is a necessity; but it does not much matter what the fad is. Any opinion or mode of conduct that is unusual and can be converted into a fad is as good as any other, and in fact the faddist seldom limits himself to a single fad. Often he cultivates half a dozen. It seems a stupid thing to do, and the imperviousness of the faddist to reason seems an indication of stupidity; but the faddist is not necessarily stupid. Many are, no doubt; and of course faddism implies a certain silliness; but though he is necessarily silly, the faddist is not necessarily stupid. Some faddists are very clever in their folly, and their ingenuity in evading and distorting the arguments of their antagonists is often quite vulpine; but they never possess the ability to attain by its means the distinction for which they crave. It is this craving for distinction that is at the root of faddism. The faddist is ambitious. He craves for distinction, but has not the ability to attain.

sufficient distinction to satisfy him ; so he is obliged to content himself with the second best. If he cannot attain distinction, he will at any cost attain singularity, and this may lead to notoriety. The adoption of a fad is an easy way of attaining, not distinction, but singularity, and the notoriety, little or much, which singularity gives. This is not distinction, but it is the best substitute for distinction that is within reach.

The faddist is usually an idle person with an active mind. He has no occupation, or what occupation he has is insufficient to occupy his active but narrow mind ; and his fad is an outlet for the part of his activity that is unoccupied. It is his hobby. He takes to it as another person takes to chess, or a third to collecting butterflies. It saves him from *ennui*. It supplies him with an interest in life, and with congenial occupation. It gives him an excuse for a pose of superiority, and to some extent satisfies his craving for distinction. It is largely because faddism is the occupation of the idle that it has pretty well disappeared since the war broke out. The faddists have found something better to do.

Chapter XIII.

THE PHILOSOPHER.

"You are a philosopher, Dr. Johnson. I have tried too in my time to be a philosopher; but, I don't know how, cheerfulness was always breaking in." This notion of the philosopher as a scowling, morose, gloomy person was never true, and was certainly not long prevalent, but it seems, from Mr. Edwards' confession to Dr. Johnson, quoted above, that it prevailed in the eighteenth century. Mr. Edwards should have remembered that Democritus was called the Laughing Philosopher, and if ever the philosopher was regarded as by nature a pessimist, that time is long past, even although the character of Carlyle gave some countenance to it. We do not now regard the philosopher as a growling, scowling pessimist, but we do regard him as a person who is not put out about little things; who does not storm when his dinner is late, or, like Carlyle, call down fire from heaven when he cannot lay his hand upon the match-box. Experience scarcely bears out this opinion. The philosopher has his full share of the infirmities of human nature. Even Dr. Johnson himself was not indifferent to the composition of his dinner, and in the controversy between him and Adam Smith, both of them said things much better left unsaid. In respect of their attitude to agreement and opposition, philosophers are

much like other men. Agree with their peculiar doctrines, and they will coo like doves and purr like kittens; but cast a doubt on their impeccability, and the coo of the dove is apt to change into the scream of the angry parrot, and the kitten bares his teeth and shows his claws.

No. The philosopher is distinguished, not by the equability of his temper, but by his devotion to thought rather than action, to principles rather than details. He searches for rules. He is a generaliser. To him an isolated fact has no value; indeed, he scarcely recognises that there can be an isolated fact. A fact is to him of value only as far as it illustrates, corroborates, or contradicts a principle; or is explained by a principle; or needs a new principle to explain it. He is the antithesis of the practical man, who despises general principles, calls the generaliser a theoretical fool, and stores his memory with disconnected facts; and he is the complement of the man of action, whose function is to apply general principles to particular cases, and especially of the inventor, whose function is to find new applications for general principles.

With action the philosopher as such has nothing to do. His business is to discover general truths; and though the discovery of a general truth always has, sooner or later a bearing upon action, yet its bearing upon act on is not often immediate, and may be very remote. Moreover, the bearing of a general truth on action, and its application to concrete cases, is rarely apparent at the time of its discovery. No philosopher ever sets out deliberately to discover what shall be of practical use and application. He sets out to discover truth; and the practical application comes afterwards, it may be a long

time afterwards, and is seldom made by the philosopher himself. Neither Copernicus nor Galileo had any expectation that the discovery of the rotation of the earth would be applied to navigation, and enable the course of a ship to be as accurately laid and kept as the course of a land journey. Clerk-Maxwell little thought that his recondite mathematical speculations would render wireless telegraphy possible. Faraday pursued his researches into electricity and magnetism without a thought of the electric telegraph and the electric motor in which they resulted. Mendel pursued his researches into inheritance with no view to the improvements in methods of breeding to which they have directly led. Pasteur never dreamed that his researches into the action of yeast would lead to the abolition of sepsis in wounds and the sensible prolongation of human life. It would be scarcely too much to say that those investigations which have been made with a direct view to utility have been the least useful. It is so at least with investigations into the incidence of the weather. A vivid but rather confused recognition of these truths leads the philosopher to look askance upon researches that have a direct utilitarian object, a feeling that finds expression in the toast reputed to have been proposed at a dinner of the Royal Society : ' Here's to the latest scientific discovery, and may it never be of the slightest use to anyone ! ' It would be vain for philosophers to attempt to exclude usefulness from their discoveries, even if the attempt were to be seriously made. We can never foresee in what unexpected ways a recondite and apparently fanciful discovery may prove useful. But though the attempt is never seriously made, and must be unsuccessful if it were made, yet it is most

desirable that investigations should never be discouraged on the ground that their utility is not apparent.

It has been said that everyone is from his birth either a Platonist or an Aristotelian. The universality of the saying is to seek, but if for everyone we substitute every philosopher, and if for a Platonist or an Aristotelian we substitute a man of deductive or of inductive mind, which is approximately what the saying means, we shall not be far astray. It is thus that men of philosophic temperaments may be divided. The man of deductive mind revels in abstractions. He formulates in the widest terms a general principle, and proceeds to deduce from it subsidiary principles, until he has erected a comprehensive and coherent system, whose principles explain all the facts within its ambit. The inductive mind begins by collecting and examining facts. After a sufficient number have been examined, their resemblances and differences noted, there seems to be a principle running through them. This principle the inductive philosopher is quick to seize ; but he does not yet build a system upon it. He looks round for relevant facts, and as he finds them he applies his principle to them and notes whether they sustain it. If they do, well and good. So far he is justified ; but he does not stop here, he looks round for more. If amongst them all he finds a single one that is irreconcilable with his principle, the principle must go. It is abandoned at once and without hesitation, and another is substituted and submitted to the same ordeal, to be perhaps abandoned in its turn. Not until every relevant fact that he can find is shown to be consistent with his principle is that principle accepted.

Each of these kinds of mind has its value, and each

is the complement of the other. The deducer finds it easy to frame an hypothesis that will explain the facts, but he is apt to take insufficient account of the facts, and to forget or ignore facts that conflict with his principle. The inducer is apt to become entangled and confused in a mass of facts for which he can find no explanatory principle. He is apt to want the wide comprehensive grasp of his facts, and the penetrating insight that discovers a principle running through them. The caricature of the deducer is the architect who designs a three-storeyed building without stairs, whose rooms are inaccessible, and whose windows give no light: the caricature of the inducer is he who piles up a heap of bricks and calls it a building. Pythagoras, who explained everything by the principle of number, is the type of the crazy deducer; the mere collector, who compiles statistical tables, is the type of the crazy inducer. In Kepler and Darwin both the inductive and the deductive turn of mind were well developed, with a decided preponderance of the inductive: in Newton and Locke they were both well developed, with a decided preponderance of deduction.

The inducer, with his keen appreciation of the value of fact, finding that facts seldom present themselves in Nature sufficiently pure and free from ambiguity for his purposes, usually devises means of isolating his facts. In other words, he is an experimenter. The deducer, perhaps because of his defective appreciation of the value of facts, is rarely an experimenter. When he does apply his principles to practical purposes, his applications border on the ludicrous. Kant, who elaborated the Categorical Imperative, invented suspenders for his stockings to take the place of garters; Herbert Spencer,

the formulator of the Theory of Evolution, invented ear-plugs to keep out trivial conversation. All the great inductive philosophers have been experimenters; none of the deductive philosophers has been an experimenter. The deducer looks upon his theories as his children, and resents any inconvenient fact that tends to injure them. He is apt first to resent and then ignore it; and at length he becomes able to ignore immense classes of facts. Bentham and his followers of the utilitarian school steadily refused to admit that men ought to be actuated by any motive but that of material interest, and at length succeeded in convincing themselves that men are not actuated by any other motive; and this they held in spite of the whole evidence of history, which shows that for one war that has been waged for material gain, two have been waged for religion, and two more for some other ideal. Hegel is another conspicuous example of the crazy deducer. His philosophy may be put briefly thus: Everything is nothing, and nothing may be anything, must be something, and perhaps is everything. The purely deductive philosopher is a moonraker, and his native place is Gotham; but this must not blind us to the truth that inductive philosophy owes all its value to the deductive element that it contains. In other words, it is only by imagination, by speculation, that principles can be devised: and heaps of facts unvitalised by a principle are not knowledge: they are only the material out of which knowledge can be constructed, and by themselves are worthless. Speculation and fact are to each other as male and female, as sperm and germ. Each by itself is barren; but unite them, and the offspring is knowledge.

Chapter XIV.

THE MAN OF BUSINESS.

The business temperament is the contradictory opposite of the artistic temperament. There are plenty of men of artistic temperament in business, and a sad hash they make of it if the temperament is much developed, and there are artists who have the business temperament in addition to that of the artist. The business temperament is quite compatible with the temperament of the artist, but quite incompatible with the artistic temperament.

The man of business temperament is he who extracts the maximum of benefit from his circumstances. He need not be clever, though to attain great success some cleverness is, of course, necessary; but he is eminently capable. Nothing is more characteristic of the business man than his power of discerning the main point and of sticking to it. Out of a tangled maze of facts, factors, and considerations, he seizes unerringly upon that which is of most importance to the purpose in view, and never loses sight of it, never allows himself to be diverted from it. Subordinate tasks have to be undertaken, subsidiary problems must be solved, preparatory arrangements must be made, but the man of business temperament never allows himself, as the merely clever person so often does, to allow the contemplation of the means to obscure

his vision of the end, or to allow that which was undertaken as a means to some ulterior end to become an end in itself and for itself. The clever surgeon, in devising the complicated details of an operation, and thinking out in every aspect the best way to perform it, is apt to forget to ask himself the question, Is this operation necessary in this case or not? Is it better to treat this patient by operation or by some other means? The operation is not an end in itself. Even to perform the operation successfully is not the main end to be pursued. The main end is to cure the patient; and this is the end that the surgeon of business temperament will never lose sight of, but that the merely clever surgeon is very apt to lose sight of.

Promptitude is another prominent characteristic of the business temperament, and one which contrasts sharply with the dilatory and procrastinating habit of the artistic temperament. The man of business temperament is prompt in all his doings. His letters are answered by return of post. His accounts go out and his bills are settled to the day. Whatever task presents itself is taken in hand at once. When Napoleon, who was the supreme example of the business temperament, heard of Sir John Moore's dash upon his communications, he started from Madrid within the hour. But it is not only in action that the man of business temperament is prompt. He is prompt in decision also. While the man of artistic temperament is wondering what had better be done, hesitating and vacillating, making up and unmaking his mind, the business temperament has decided what to do and done it. This facility of prompt decision rests upon the fundamental business quality of discerning and selecting without fail the main end to be

striven for. When this is held in view, a multitude of alternative courses are swept aside as irrelevant. They may be important, but their importance is subsidiary. The business temperament looks to what is vital, and from the constant habit of selecting the thing that is vital acquires a readiness to recognise it and disentangle it from things that are important only, and not vital. Hence the choice becomes cleared. Instead of being among a dozen things, it is limited to two or three alternatives ; and between these the choice of that which most contributes to the main and vital end is more easily, and therefore more promptly, made. With the business temperament promptness of decision, no less than promptitude of action, becomes a habit.

From the same clear view of the main purpose to be pursued, it follows that the man of business temperament is perservering. The fixation of his attention and interest on the main purpose is a safeguard against wandering efforts. He gets through what he is doing, and sticks to it until it is done, for the same reason that the traveller keeps to the road, and does not stray into the adjoining fields and woods ; that is to say, because he looks to the end in view. He never forgets that the subsidiary task on which he is engaged is subsidiary. He does not stray aimlessly from the road because the adjoining country is more inviting; but if he sees a path that will take him more directly to his destination, he quits the road instantly and follows the new path. He is shy of novelties only when he does not see clearly that they serve his main purpose, that they lead to his main end ; but he is quick to see and adopt them when they do so. The business man is not often clever at devising new expedients. That is not his

business. His business is to examine the expedients proposed by clever men, and to decide whether they will or will not serve his purpose better than those he is using. If they will not, it matters not how clever they are, he will have nothing to do with them. If they will, he sacrifices his existing arrangements without hesitation and without scruple.

The man of business temperament is a good organiser; that is to say, he is orderly not only in his acts, but in his thoughts. He does not deal with things in the gross, but arranges and classifies them; and again his power of organisation depends on his power of seeing clearly and adhering closely to the main purpose. For the same things can be classified in as many ways as there are purposes to serve by the classification, and the mode of classification should be governed entirely by the purpose it has to serve. The gardener classifies plants primarily according as they are ornamental or edible, for his purposes are to make one part of the garden ornamental, and to grow edible plants in another. The botanist classifies plants according to their mode of reproduction, for his purpose is to discover their natural affinities. The pharmacist classifies them according to their effects on those who consume them, for his purpose is to produce these effects. The economist classifies them according to their utility and merchantableness, in accordance with his purpose of growing them to a profit. When we say that a man is a good organiser, we mean that he is a good classifier for the purpose he has in view. If he organises a business, he classifies his goods or his operations of manufacture into departments, and he is a good or a bad organiser according as his classification serves well or ill the purpose he has in view. In a

factory he must so classify his departments that his raw material pursues the easiest and most uninterrupted course from one department to another, until it ends as a finished product at the place from which it is easiest to deliver it. He must organise his staff so that he can lay his finger on the particular man who is responsible for any particular operation, and so that every man looks to but one superior for orders, and has full control subject to those orders. He classifies each kind of work into a separate department with a separate staff, and each staff into its own hierarchy of officials. From beginning to end, organisation is classification, and as classification always has a reference to purpose, and is good or bad according as the purpose is kept in view and as it serves the purpose, he is the best organiser who keeps the purpose of the organisation most steadily in view.

In organising or classifying men for any purpose, it is very necessary, not only that the classification should suit for the purpose in view, but that the men should also be fit for the places they take in the organisation. To put round men into square holes, and *vice versâ*, is bad organisation. The man of business temperament who is a good organiser, never does this. In order that he should avoid this mistake he must estimate with accuracy, not only the qualities that are required for the place, but also the qualities possessed by the man he proposes to put into the place. In other words, he must have an insight into character. This is the inborn gift of the business temperament. Steady fixation of the attention on purpose may be cultivated ; promptness of action and of decision may develop by exercise ; classification may be learnt ; but insight into character

is inborn, and he who has it not as a birthright can never acquire it in any considerable degree. All of us possess some rudiment of it, no doubt, and some qualities show themselves so conspicuously that there is little difficulty in gauging them; but to tell by a single interview whether or not a man is trustworthy, as Charles Darwin's father could, or whether he has the moral courage to bear great responsibilities, or whether he is of prompt decision and clear judgment in important matters, this is a gift which few possess, and which perhaps none can acquire. Anyone can tell on a very short acquaintance whether a man is clever or stupid, conceited or modest, reticent or leaky, strong or weak in character, for these are qualities that blaze out conspicuously, that shout aloud, and cannot be overlooked; but by what fine and subtle indications, elusive to the eye and ear, and discernible only by some sixth sense, it can be discovered whether a man is trustworthy, loyal, courageous, ready in emergencies, capable of inspiring confidence, of leading and managing men, of devotion to a cause, and of steadiness in adversity—these are to most people unknown; but they are in some mysterious way perceived by the man of business temperament, whose most valuable faculty is his ability to read character aright, and to place round men in round holes, and square men in square holes.

Chapter XV.

THE PRACTICAL MAN.

The practical man is, as his title implies, concerned with doing things; and in as far as he recognises that action is the most important function of animate beings, he has grasped a great truth; but what he does not appreciate so well is that action, if it is to be successful, must be based upon knowledge, and he is apt to despise knowledge. He has a great contempt for the theorist, whom he calls a theoretical fool, and he does not appreciate that, as all action is founded on knowledge, so all knowledge is supposititous; nor does he appreciate that, much as he despises theory and the theorist, he is himself the most thorough-going theorist of them all. His favourite expression is 'The fact is' so-and-so, that which he takes for a fact being usually a wild and groundless speculation. 'The fact is,' the practical doctor tells his hypochondriac patient, 'your liver is out of order, and I shall give you some medicine to stimulate its action.' The supposition that the patient's symptoms are due to derangement of the functions of the liver is a wild speculation, resting on no basis of fact, and on no evidence whatever. The doctor has a very hazy notion of what the functions of the liver are, and if he were asked to connect these functions with the patient's symptoms, he could not do so. To do him justice, he

would not try. He would regard the question as 'theoretical trash,' and if it were pushed, he would probably say, 'How do I know? Because I am a practical man. I give him some medicine to stimulate his liver, and you will see that will cure him.' Accordingly, he administers taraxacum and podophyllin, or calomel and jalap, and his patient does recover. 'There!' says he triumphantly, 'Now who was right?' He was right in supposing that taraxacum and podophyllin or c. cum. j. would cure his patient, but there is not the slightest evidence that any of these drugs could or did stimulate the liver; nor has he any inkling of what would happen if the functions of the liver were stimulated. The supposition that they acted on the liver is as wild and baseless a speculation as the supposition that the functions of the liver were disordered. But, it may be said, What does it matter, as long as the patient recovers? And it is true that as long as the patient recovers it does not matter—to the patient. But it matters a great deal to the doctor. In this case his speculation did no harm; but this case is exceptional. He did not, in fact, base his action on his hypothesis, though no doubt he thought he did. The real reason for the administration of the drugs was neither the belief that the liver was disordered nor the belief that the drugs would rectify this disorder, though no doubt both these beliefs existed. The real reason for his action was that the same drugs had cured a similar disorder in other cases; and whether they cured the disorder by acting on the liver or in other ways did not matter in the least. In this case no harm was done; but the harm that has been done, and is daily being done, by the practical man in proceeding on a false

hypothesis which he does not know to be an hypothesis, but fondly believes is an established fact, is incalculable. The number of patients who have been killed by attempts to 'disperse the peccant humour' or to 'bring on the crisis,' is no doubt very great, but it is to be doubted whether these attempts had more disastrous effects than attempts to purify the blood, or to reduce the acidity, or to correct an alimentary toxæmia, or to diminish the intake of purin.

The practical man reads little. He is unable to grasp an abstraction. His vocabulary is limited; but he makes up for the limitation of his knowledge of words by his implicit belief in the power of the words that he does possess. He does not distinguish between words and things; a word is to him as good as a thing; and a verbal explanation which explains nothing is to him completely satisfactory. He is puzzled by the behaviour of his pears, which turn black and fall off the tree as soon as they have reached the size of a crab or a sloe; but tell him it is a blight, and he is satisfied, and does not care to inquire further. His rubber syringe, which was so elastic and pliable, is become hard and rigid, and when it is squeezed it cracks and splits. What has happened to it? Tell the practical man that it is perished, and he is quite satisfied. He knows now as much as he cares to know, and thinks he knows now more than he knew before he was in possession of the explanatory word. He sees that criminality is not prevented by punishing criminals, and declares that the only true remedy is education; but if you can get at his notion of education it consists of teaching reading and writing, and a few other things, including Latin grammar; and even the practical man would not consider a knowledge of

Latin grammar an effectual antidote to criminality. But in using the term 'education' as a preventive of criminality, he does not attach any meaning to education. He does not go behind the word, and 'education' is to him as effectual a word as 'blight' or 'perished.' The word alone is sufficient. The passion for giving names to things has been inherent in the human race ever since Adam gave names to all the animals, and no doubt it is convenient, in speaking of things, to have names to speak of them by; but the practical man is apt to regard the name of a thing as not only an inherent and inseparable quality of the thing, but as a key to all its other qualities; hence to him a name is satisfying. He is not so very far removed from the savage who believes that knowledge of his enemy's name gives him power over that enemy. Hence all the diagnostic efforts of the doctor who is a practical man are devoted to finding a name for his patient's malady; and when he has attached a name to it, he is content. He now takes it for granted that he knows all that there is to be known about the disease. To picture to himself the train of disordered processes in their sequence is an effort that it never occurs to him to make. Like the savage, he regards possession of the name as possession of power over the thing named.

The practical man sees what is obvious, and misses what is important if it is not obvious also. The practical man laughed at Copernicus and Galileo, for he saw the sun rise and set, and surely seeing is believing! Practical men clamour for taxes to be laid on foreign-made goods, so that the money shall go to enrich the British producer and not the foreigner. The payment to the foreigner for his goods is obvious, and cannot be

overlooked ; what is overlooked is that this payment is made, not in money, but in goods, and that these goods must be produced by the British producer, to whom, and not to the foreigner, the money goes directly ; and another thing that is overlooked is that the British producer does not part with his goods to the foreigner as a gift, nor even upon equal terms, but that he parts with what he does not want in exchange for what he does. He parts with what he can produce in exchange for what he cannot, or with what he can produce easily, and therefore cheaply, in exchange for what he can produce only with difficulty, and therefore expensively. Practical men clamour for the State to do this and that, or to find the funds for doing this and that, with the implied conviction that the State holds a Fortunatus' purse, and that what the State does is pure gain to everyone, and costs nothing to anyone but the State. That the State has no money except what it takes out of the pockets of its citizens is not sufficiently obvious to impress them.

The practical man takes short views. He adapts direct means to immediate ends. If the progress of the horse up the hill is arrested, the remedy of the practical man is not to take some of the bricks out of the cart, but to flog the horse. If the patient is emaciated, exhausted and hungry, the remedy of the practical woman is to give him a good square meal. That her unfortunate victim has turned the corner of typhoid fever, and that the good square meal is likely to be fatal, is unknown to her. Rags and dirt are signs of poverty, and poverty is to be relieved by charitable gifts, and therefore the benevolent practical man is profuse in almsgiving to the ragged and dirty, and so accentuates poverty instead of relieving it.

The practical man is less crudely practical than he was. He has discovered by many an experience and many an example that the longest way round is sometimes the shortest way there. He has a glimmering of knowledge that after all the most obvious remedy is not always the best remedy ; that diarrhœa is sometimes best treated, not with astringents and opiates, but with castor oil ; that the true remedy for poverty is not to give alms but to give opportunity ; that the result of manuring his fruit trees is more likely to be increase of wood than increase of fruit ; that the remedy for discontent is not repression and coercion, but the removal of its cause ; that, in short, action, to be efficient, must be founded upon knowledge ; and therefore he craves for knowledge. But his impulsion to immediate action is so strong that he is ready to seize upon anything that purports to be knowledge, and to act upon it. He wants to be doing something to remedy the ills of which he has a keen appreciation, and he has neither the patience to wait for a rational remedy nor usually the intelligence to judge whether a remedy is rational or not ; so he plunges. While detesting the ' theoretical fool,' he does not recognise that, whatever his action, it must be founded on supposition, and as he cannot distinguish supposition from fact, he is at the mercy of every crank who puts forward a supposition and calls it a fact. He used to believe that gout was due to excessive drinking of port wine ; he now knows that it is due to excessive production of uric acid, and that this is again due to consuming too much purin. He used to believe that poverty could be relieved by almsgiving ; he now knows that the proper way to relieve poverty is by the formation of committees and the extension of the suffrage.

He used to believe that shirking and cowardice were vices to be punished; he now knows that they are manifestations of a laudable tenderness of conscience. The practical man must be doing something. He is not content to wait, and watch, and investigate, until he knows the right thing to do. He must do something, even if it is the wrong thing, which it very often is. It if for this reason that we always order two tablespoonsful three times a day. It is doing something; and as the majority of our patients are practical persons, they demand that something shall be done. The illness runs its course, and most illnesses run their natural course towards recovery. In these our two tablespoonsful seldom do good, and let us hope they seldom do harm. Their real function is not to affect the patient, but to satisfy the urgent need of his practical female relatives to be doing something to help him.

Chapter XVI.

THE MAN OF ACTION.

The man of action, or of adventurous temperament, abounds in energy which is well under control. It is not the strong, but the weak, who display perpetual fussy movement. The man of action is distinguished in a mixed company by his tranquillity. He has tremendous energy, but he keeps it under control, in reserve, out of sight, ready for action if called upon, but not to be expended without good reason. The silent strong man of the popular novelist has incurred a good deal of ridicule, but this is because he has not always been skilfully portrayed, and has sometimes been caricatured. The type exists, and is, perhaps, produced more frequently in England than in most countries.

The man of action is born at all adventure. He springs up as a surprise in the most unexpected quarters. His father may be studious and his mother an invalid, but they both come of good healthy stock. He gets from them a fine, strong, physical constitution, capable of great and long-enduring exertion, slow to feel fatigue, insusceptible to heat and cold, resistant to disease. He can take much exertion with little sleep. He sleeps readily and soundly, but is capable of going long without sleep. His sleep is under control. He can fall asleep when he pleases, wake when he pleases, and take refreshing sleep in snatches when he finds it con-

venient. He is a fine animal. His senses are keen and he knows how to use them. His sight is neither long nor short, he has a keen ear, a keen nose, and a sensitive touch; and he is highly observant. He notices things that other people overlook; in particular he is sensitive to shades of expression, and so divines as if by instinct the attitude and feelings of those with whom he is dealing.

Being of boundless and consuming energy, his proclivity is to action; and since his power of inhibition is great, and his energy is under strong control, it is employed, not in actuating fine movements of small muscles, but in large, vigorous action of the whole man. Over his finer movements the man of action has complete control. His facial muscles, the muscles of expression, are under the mastery of the will, so that when he pleases he wears an impenetrable mask. He never gesticulates. His superabundant energy does not dribble away in little movements of the fingers and hands. Indeed, his hands, and the management of his hands, are alone enough to characterise him. They are large and broad and firm. The thumb is well opposed, and even when at rest is on a plane at right angles with his palm. When you shake hands with him, his fingers and metacarpus do not crumple up into a flabby bunch: the hand is as firm as a piece of wood. And it is always in a position to be instantly available. You never catch him with his hands in his pockets. His eye is steady, but it is well opened and alert. It is not attracted by every movement that is going on around him, but nevertheless the movements do not escape him, for he can attend almost equally well to all parts of his field of vision. He is not necessarily very muscular, but he shows in his deep chest the capacity for endurance.

As his energy is great, and is not dissipated in small movements of small muscles, he demands wide spaces to move in. Sedentary life is unbearable to him. He loves the open air and unrestricted freedom of movement. Restriction to the confines of a road is almost as irksome to him as restriction to the confines of a room. He is a man of wide horizons, and the conventions and petty restrictions of the highly organised life of towns press upon him with intolerable restraint, the more so because his consciousness of his own power makes him insensible to fear and contemptuous of danger. He has a well-justified confidence in himself, and longs for the opportunity to put forth the powers that he feels he possesses; and this is the adventurous spirit. Such men are the explorers and adventurers, travellers, into strange lands, leaders of romantic expeditions, big-game hunters, mountain-climbers, pioneers, conquerors. Such men were Alexander, Zenghis Khan, Tamerlane, Attila, Pizarro, Cortez, the Cabots, Sir Walter Raleigh, Captain Cook, Napoleon, Sir John Franklin, Marco Polo, Speke, Burton, and many another.

Men of this temperament are fearless. Their control over their energy and bodily powers is so complete that no danger can disturb it. However appalling the position they are in, they remain cool, their faculties alert, their judgment undisturbed. However suddenly the emergency arises, they are not flustered nor perturbed. Nay, it is said of some of the greatest men of action that it requires a position of imminent danger to call out their great qualities; that they were never so cool, their judgment never so well balanced and perfect, as in some great emergency. Thus it is with the hunter of

big game, who reserves his fire till the charging beast is within a few yards of him ; thus it was with the captain of the sailing ship when the squall struck him unexpectedly ; thus it was with Cromwell when his wing was carried away by Rupert's charge ; thus it was with Warren Hastings when he was outvoted on his Council, and Nuncomar brought forward his accusation ; and thus it was with Clive when his officers mutinied.

It is the same completeness of self-control that gives to the man of action his rapidity of decision. All his powers of body and mind are in hand. They do not need to be summoned, sent for, and collected. They are ready at an instant's notice to be applied in this direction or in that. He seems to jump to his conclusions by an unfailing instinct, but this is very far from his mental process. The alternatives pass through his mind in a flash, and the long habit of rapid decision enables him to select on the instant.

The man of action is the born leader of men. His strength, his confidence in himself, his complete control over his own powers, give him a similar control over others. In making up his own mind he makes up the minds of others. Mankind may be divided for different purposes in a variety of ways. We may divide them into men of thought and men of action ; we may divide them into men of inductive mind and men of deductive mind ; we may divide them into those whose passion is for utility and those whose passion is for beauty ; we may divide them into the civilised, the semi-civilised, barbarians, savages, and Germans ; or we may divide them into leaders and led. Most men belong to the latter class. They have neither the courage, the initiative, the originality, nor the strength of character to

strike out a line of conduct for themselves. They are slaves to convention, to fashion, and to custom. They are under the thraldom of what people will think, and no prospect is so terrible to them as that people should think that they are not machine-made and turned out by the gross. Their religion is the religion of the jumping cat, and they dare not move until they see which way the cat is going to jump Such people without a leader are as sheep having no shepherd. They huddle together, trying to gain confidence from contact with their fellows ; and there they will remain, huddled together, without moving this way or that, until a leader appears upon the scene ; but they are ready, willing, and anxious to follow anyone who inspires them with confidence, and commands them with an authoritative voice. They wait for the man of action, and he, with his abounding vitality and self-confidence, can lead them whither he pleases. The confidence that he feels he easily inspires in others, and men instinctively feel and appreciate the quality of leadership. If a dozen men meet for the first time round table in committee, before half an hour is over one will have established his ascendancy, or they will be divided into two groups, each under the dominance of a leader ; nay, if half a dozen men get into conversation in a railway carriage, one will have established his ascendency before the end of the journey. When many men are engaged for any time in the same enterprise, they soon fall under the dominance of a leader, even if they begin as a mob ; and when once a leader has established his leadership and shown the qualities of the man of action in high degree, there is no sacrifice that his followers will refuse him, no task he can set that they will shrink from. During his

life his followers are his slaves, and after his death they deify him.

The men of action leave behind them the greatest names, but they are not the greatest revolutionisers. As often as not their achievements are barren; and prodigious as they loomed in the eyes of contemporaries, they produce little effect on subsequent generations. The history neither of Greece nor of India was much affected by the conquests of Alexander, but the history of Europe has been profoundly affected by Aristotle. Attila might as well have remained at home for all the effect he produced on the history of France. It was Erasmus more than Luther, Voltaire and Rousseau rather than Napoleon, who revolutionised Europe. Bismarck was the greatest man of action of the last half of the nineteenth century, but Bismarck s work is now in a fair way to be undone: the effect of Darwin's work increases year by year. The man of action reaps his reward during his lifetime; the man of thought does not enter into his kingdom till after he is dead. Then

> Nations, slowly wise and meanly just,
> To buried merit raise the tardy bust.

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